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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE SPHERE OF POLITICS: HOW
BUREAUCRACY CAN FACILITATE DEMOCRACY WITH POLICY DECISIONS
by
Nicholas Sergio Martinez
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Shaoming Cheng, Major Professor
Public bureaucracy finds itself in a strange place at the intersection of political
science and public administration. Political science finds that, within representative
democracy, discretion granted to bureaucrats threatens the nature of democracy by
subverting politicians who represent the will of the people – bureaucracy vs democracy.
At the same time, public administration holds that, in the interest of promoting
democracy, bureaucracy should be objective in its implementation of policy in a way that
eliminates the influence of politics from decision-making – politics vs bureaucracy.
Those positions are seemingly contradictory in nature. From one perspective,
bureaucracy is undemocratic because it is outside of politics, yet an overreach of politics
into the bureaucracy yields undemocratic outcomes.
Bureaucracy can facilitate democracy outside of politics. This study looks to
empirically test whether local bureaucrats, who should be willing to act in-line with
influential co-partisans, might still promote democratic outcomes for their constituents
with their discretionary decision-making. Florida provides an empirical backdrop for
testing bureaucracy’s impact on democracy with a natural experimental scenario created
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with the passing of new early voting limitations in 2011. Florida’s Republican (R)
lawmakers passed House Bill 1355 (HB 1355), which was signed into law by Governor
Scott (R), that dramatically limited the early voting days allowed for federal elections.
HB 1355 changed the early voting (EV) period from fourteen (14) days to eight (8) days
and eliminated the last Sunday before Election Day as well. The move was widely seen
as a political calculation aimed at stifling the participation of Democrats in the 2012
General Election. In seeming lockstep, local Supervisors of Elections (SOEs) from both
parties utilized their statutory discretion over the location of early voting sites to alter the
distribution of sites before the 2012 General Election.
I find that Republican SOEs did not distribute early voting locations in a way that
negatively impacted early voting participation rates (EVPR) for their local precincts.
Furthermore, I find that, all else equal, their decisions did not statistically impact EVPR
differently than the EVPR in communities managed by Democrats. Republican SOEs did
not add new costs to voters in their communities. I provide new evidence that
demonstrates that bureaucrats can indeed limit the impact of undue politics from their
influential co-partisans to promote more democratic outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Protecting a Fundamental Right
President Barack Obama began his victory speech confirming his reelection at
11:20 PM Eastern on Election Day, November 6, 2012. While he was speaking, voters
were still waiting to cast ballots. News stations simulcast the President speaking live
contrasted by footage of Florida’s voters waiting in the dark to enter their assigned
polling station; the polls had officially closed in Florida over four hours earlier. The
President told the audience that night, “[W]e have to fix that,” referring to the long lines
voters had to endure to cast their ballots during early voting and on Election Day; he
urged voters to stay in line.
During his State of the Union in February of 2013, President Obama reflected on
the importance of voting and the implications of long lines.
“Defending our freedom, though, is not just the job of our military alone. We
must all do our part to make sure our God-given rights are protected here at home.
That includes one of the most fundamental rights of a democracy: the right to vote.
Now, when any American, no matter where they live or what their party, are denied
that right because they can't afford to wait for 5 or 6 or 7 hours just to cast their
ballot, we are betraying our ideals.”
– President Barack Obama, State of Union, February 12, 2013 –
Recognizing that the integrity of an election is vital to maintaining democracy, the
President announced he would create a nonpartisan commission to, “…improve the
voting experience in America.” (President Barack Obama, 2013).
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Following the State of the Union, President Obama released Executive Order
13639 – Establishment of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration
(PCEA) – on March 28, 2013. The PCEA’s official mission stated that, “The
Commission shall identify best practices and otherwise make recommendations to
promote the efficient administration of elections in order to ensure that all eligible voters
have the opportunity to cast their ballots without undue delay, and to improve the
experience of voters facing other obstacles in casting their ballots, such as members of
the military, overseas voters, voters with disabilities, and voters with limited English
proficiency.” The President’s goal was to ensure that those tasked with running U.S.
elections are equipped to manage their responsibility in safeguarding election integrity.
Election administration was the culprit behind the problems surrounding the 2012
General Election, as it was during the maligned 2000 General Election.
Statement of the Problem
Obstacles that impede voter participation deteriorate election integrity. Excessive
wait times are symptomatic of inefficient election administration. Inefficient election
administration imposes costs on voters. The introduction of new costs to vote will
dissuade voters from casting their ballot. Election administrators have wide discretion to
make decisions about election processes. Sometimes, election administrators use
discretion in a politically motivated way which can burden citizens by adding new
obstacles to voting. When that is true, election administrators can be culpable of
malpractice.
International elections scholars segregate the malpractices that weaken election
integrity into two categories – first-order and second-order problems. First-order
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problems are those characterized by egregious violence or violations of human-rights;
second-order problems, “…involve mundane issues of maladministration, lack of
technical capacity, or human error.” Established democracies, like the United States, deal
with second-order problems characterized by maladministration. Though much of the
issues surrounding poor election administration may be the result of a simple accident or
poor decision-making, malpractice can be purposeful, and even legally sanctioned.
(Norris, 2013, p. 566)
Unfortunately, voters standing in long lines and enduring extensive wait-times to
vote in Florida was not simply the consequence of poor decision-making, but rather
second-order malpractice that was driven by political motivation. A dramatic change to
Florida’s election laws came during Florida’s 2011 legislative session. Florida’s
Republican state lawmakers passed House Bill 1355 (HB 1355) which altered Florida’s
election laws. HB 1355 restricted the early voting period from fourteen (14) days to eight
(8) days and ended the term on the Saturday before Election Day. Early voting is a
method of voting that allows voters to cast their ballot before Election Day. Early voting
is permitted to promote convenience, and to boost voter participation (Gronke, 2008).
The changes to Florida’s early voting laws made early voting less convenient; it was a
purposeful political action codified in state legislation (Herron & Smith, 2014).
Purpose of the Study
Florida’s elected officials passed specific legislation that negatively impacted its
voters. Apart from the elected official’s actions, Florida has sixty-seven (67) local
bureaucrats, the County Supervisors of Elections (SOEs). The SOEs are responsible for
local election administration. They hold broad discretionary authority over numerous
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aspects of the voting process, like the number of voting registration drives they host, the
type of voting machine used in their jurisdiction, the number of poll workers assigned to
facilitate voting, etc.
They also have the authority to decide the number and location of early voting
facilities in their communities. Pursuant to F.S 101.657, the SOEs are only required to
have one early voting site for their jurisdiction. Beyond that, the SOE can select any city
hall or permanent public library facility as early voting sites as long as the sites are,
“[G]eographically located so as to provide all voters in the county an equal opportunity to
cast a ballot, insofar as is practicable.”
SOEs have full discretion over the number and location of early voting sites
within their respective communities. This dissertation seeks to uncover what caused
lower early voting participation in 2012 than in 2008. Existing research shows that
changing the location of polling stations adds costs to voters (Brady & McNulty, 2011).
This dissertation shows how the SOEs changed their early voting locations between 2008
and 2012, how those changes impacted early voting participation, and whether those
decisions were politically motivated
Research Question and Hypothesis
Many factors can influence whether groups of voters who live in the same voting
precinct (analogous to a neighborhood) vote. Is precinct early voting participation
affected by changes in the distance to the nearest early voting site from one election to
the other? More specifically, do local SOEs make discretionary decisions, based on their
partisan affiliation, that can impact how constituents cast their ballot? Since Florida’s
state Republican leaders limited early voting by passing new laws, I hypothesize that if a
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local Supervisor of Elections, who is registered as a Republican, moved the location of
early voting sites in their communities for the 2012 General Election from their location
in the 2008 election, then those changes will lower precinct early voting participation.
The analysis reveals the differentiated effect Republican SOEs had on early voting
participation.
Findings and Contribution
Very few studies have looked at the impact that discretionary decisions made by the
LEO have on voters. This dissertation provides new empirical evidence showing the
effects of partisanship on decision-making as it relates to election laws and administrative
practices. It further showcases how local discretion affects outcomes, shown here as the
corresponding impact on voter participation in an election. Specifically, the research
explores the discretionary decision-making of the local Supervisors of Elections (SOEs)
in Florida. I find that, although local-level bureaucrats, SOEs, have discretionary powers
to manipulate election systems, they disregard efforts of political co-optation. Therefore,
public bureaucrats do not abuse their discretion at the whim of their political
counterparts, suggesting they are duty-bound.
The results support the hypothesis that bureaucrats do play a role in ensuring
democratic processes, and do not succumb to political brinksmanship. Ultimately, I find
that Republican SOEs, who used their discretion in selecting the number and location of
early voting sites, did not negatively impact early voting participation rates (EVPR)
differently than other SOEs.
Public bureaucrats provide a firewall between politics and citizen interest, making
them integral to a healthy representative democracy. This research provides new insight
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into the core theories of public administration – politics vs. bureaucracy and
representative bureaucracy - to ascertain how they manifest in this empirical setting.
Theoretical Framework
Local discretion can be motivated by partisan identity through active
representation. Active representation is decision-making on the part of the bureaucracy
that purposely targets a specific group of citizens (Hindera, 1993, p. 419) in a manner that
is partial and purposeful (Lim, 2006, p. 194). Scholars in public administration advocate
for active representation of the bureaucracy to, “promote minority interests” (Selden,
Brudney, & Kellough, 1998). Yet, if those actions are motivated by political interests,
local bureaucrats can promote public policy that is injurious to their citizens. This
theoretical framework is important to understand the implicit motivation behind certain
public policy decisions.
Research Design and Methods
The empirical scenario creates a natural experiment whereby the local SOEs
moved some early voting locations from one election to the next. The research methods
use advanced regression models to explore the political influence of partisan identity of
local SOEs, and whether their response to politically motivated changes in the State’s
early voting election laws affected voting outcomes, namely the early voting participation
rate (EVPR). The analysis uses publicly available voter data made available by Florida’s
Department of State, Division of Elections, to build reliable models that can assess what
factors influence early voting participation. This dissertation uses spatial econometric
methods, primarily the spatial Durbin error model (SDEM), for estimation. The SDEM is
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a statistical method that estimates local spillover effects by incorporating the average of
the independent variables from its neighbors and adding a spatially weighted error term.
Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 2, Background and Questions, describes the empirical scenario driving
the main question of the analysis. A new election law, HB 1355, altered the days and
times available for early voting, making it less convenient. The chapter shows that, in
response to new the new election laws, Florida’s local election bureaucrats, the
Supervisor of Elections, added or removed early voting sites using their discretionary
authority. These changes may have been motivated by politics and the party identity the
SOEs carry. The chapter closes introducing the research questions and corresponding
hypotheses.
Chapter 3, Theoretical and Empirical Foundation, introduces the
politics/bureaucracy divide that causes friction in a representative democracy. The
chapter explains how local discretion can be motivated by partisan identity. The chapter
continues to show how public policy that adds costs to voting will dissuade voters from
participating in an election through simple economic models; limitations to convenience
adds costs to voters. The chapter concludes by describing the inherent inequities built into
voting participation and how voters calculate the cost impacts of distance and quality of
voting locations in their decision to vote.
Chapter 4, Data and Operationalization of the Variables, introduces the main data
sources for this dissertation. They are the Florida Voter Registration System (FVRS),
U.S. Census Tiger Line files, early voting site lists from the Department of State,
Division of Elections, and the Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections
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(FSASE) directory. The FVRS dataset contains over 12 million voter records that are
combined with another 51 million records of voting history data. The Tiger data contains
over 1 million line-segments that facilitate geocoding of the voter data. Those points are
aggregated into neighborhood geographies, precincts, which are the unit of analysis.
Chapter 5, Methods, covers the research design. I specify the importance social
scientists must place on the spatiotemporal aspects of data analysis, to deal with the
spatial dependence artifacts that a traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
cannot handle. Five additional spatial regression models, the spatial lag X, the spatial lag
model, the spatial error model, the spatial Durbin model, and the spatial Durbin Error
model show how spatial regressions improve upon a traditional OLS. Each model adds
spatial aspects of the data to the regression model. The chapter closes by describing the
generic and specific equations for of the OLS and SDEM.
Chapter 6, Findings and Results, provides the model returns for the OLS and
SDEM models and compares them. The SDEM model allows for the interpretation of the
direct and indirect effects of a control variable on the dependent variable, or the ‘total
effect’. I find that Republican SOEs did not distribute early voting locations in a way that
negatively impacted early voting participation rates (EVPR) for their local precincts.
Furthermore, I find that Republican SOEs did not add new costs to voters in their
communities. When controlling for other factors, the decisions of Republican SOEs to
change the location of early voting sites in their community from their locations in 2008
did not statistically impact precinct EVPR differently than the precinct EVPR in
communities managed by Democrats/NPA Supervisors.
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Chapter 7, Conclusion, provides final thoughts on the dissertation, including both
theoretical and empirical findings, limitations, and ideas for new policy implementations.
Ultimately, this study presents new evidence that demonstrates that bureaucrats can
indeed limit the influence of undue politics from their influential co-partisans to promote
more democratic outcomes.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND QUESTIONS
U.S. Elections
Democracies use elections to facilitate the transfer of power from one
representative to another. In fact, “free and fair” elections are a critical element of a true
democracy. For elections to be “free and fair” certain simple conditions must be met.
“Free” means that everyone who is eligible to participate in an election can participate in
that election without undue restriction; “fair” means that every ballot is counted
appropriately with each vote having the same weight. The United States has changed its
laws over time to reach closer to its ideal, “free and fair” elections for its democracy.
Numerous amendments to the Constitution expanded the franchise over the years (14th,
15th, 19th, 24th and the 26th). The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA 1965) was an
important advancement of the Civil Rights movement creating federal election
protections and allowing for minorities to participate more widely in their expression of
the franchise. President Bush reconfirmed the VRA in 2006 as the Voting Rights
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006.
Though federal law might establish the framework for elections, the United
States, unlike many international democracies, does not have a federal agency that is
responsible for election standards. The U.S. election system is a hyper-federalized
administrative system; decision-making authority is vested in very small jurisdictions at
the county and sub-county level (Ewald 2009). It is imperative to underscore that election
administration is the practical management of voting. “Election administration is the
administrative procedure used for casting votes and compiling the electoral register”
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(James 2012, p. 15). Some of the more notable tasks of election administrators are
maintaining the voter register, qualifying candidates, performing outreach to register
voters, programming voting equipment, training poll workers, and identifying polling
locations. Scholars noted problems with election administration decades ago; “There is
probably no other phase of public administration in the United States, which is so badly
managed as the conduct of elections” (Harris, 1934, p. 1). Some issues with election
management are a result of changes to election laws, latent technology adoption, and
issues with administrative capacity. Every citizen’s individual right to participate in
elections without impediment is still not fully actualized across all communities in the
nation. Election laws and election administration are to blame. The scrutiny of votes cast
demonstrates the little attention paid to election administration and how election
administration is integral to a healthy democracy.
Florida and Election Administration
Unprofessionally managed elections have failed our democracy’s fundamental
requirement of holding “free and fair” elections. The United States’ poorly run elections
continue to be a spectacle as the balance of international politics sways with every
contested ballot. In 2000, Florida became the example of poorly run elections and why
election administration matters to the validity of election outcomes. (James 2012)
Florida is markedly important to federal election outcomes, not only from the
lessons learned from its handling of the 2000 General Election but also from its
population growth as well. Since 2000 Florida has been one of the most influential swing
states in the nation. The State offers twenty-nine (29) electoral votes to its winner,
making it a crucial battleground for presidential candidates. Away from the elections
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themselves, Florida’s lawmakers strategize ways to influence turnout to ensure their party
can favorably compete for Florida’s coveted electoral votes.
Before General Election Day on November 7, 2000, lawmakers, legal scholars,
and academics traditionally focused on the laws that dictate elections, while the media
and public honed-in on the candidates; few were interested in the bureaucrats who
administer US elections. Our collective attention changed the next day. “On the morning
of Wednesday 8 November 2000, the world’s attention was on electoral administration”
(James, 2010, p. 357). The nation learned that morning that the systems that allow us to
participate in our democracy – how we cast our votes – can have an outsized weight on
the reliability of election outcomes.
Election administration is the operational aspect of an electoral system. Election
administration is particularly complex because it involves many actors. The States are
responsible for election administration. Within the states, many smaller jurisdictional
agencies, or local elections officers (LEOs), administer elections. In Florida, where the
problems of long lines and excessive vote times were especially bad, the Florida
Legislature and the Supervisors of Elections (SOEs) run the elections. There is an SOE
for each of Florida’s 67 counties, pursuant to the Florida Constitution. The SOEs put into
practice the election laws as designated by the Florida Legislature with interpretation
provided by the Division of Elections.
The main bureaucrats who facilitate and affect election administration are the
local election officials (LEOs). LEOs are the people who make decisions on how to
provide voting access, only constrained by budget and their professional capacity.
Election administrators are the “street-level bureaucrats” of the election system (Kimball
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& Kropf, 2006). The 2000 General Election brought a renewed interest in LEOs as
important decision-makers who have wide discretion in running elections. In 2000
Florida’s local election officials, the Supervisors of Elections (SOEs), had the
discretionary authority to select voting machines (mechanical vs. digital) and ballot
design (paper ballots vs. punch card) to count the votes. Different technology and ballot
design led to inconsistent administration from one Florida county to the next. The mixed
practices made for an inconclusive election outcome, causing a recount. In their ruling in
Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court ended the recount blaming the lack of uniformity from
one county to the next in how they handled the recount; some counties performed a
machine recount while others conducted a hand recount. The 2000 General Election
invited the public to question the outsized role election administrators have on election
outcomes and, precisely what might influence the decisions they make in facilitating an
election.
After the 2000 election, the federal government enacted new laws aimed at
promoting uniformity in election administration. Elements of the Help America Vote Act
(Public Law 107-252) (commonly referred to as HAVA) required the states to limit local
discretion. For instance, HAVA (2002) required that states compile statewide databases
of all voter records to build confidence in the lists of eligible voters. HAVA (2002) also
established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). The EAC helps election
administrators with guidance on how to implement the HAVA requirements. Both were
designed to not only improve access to elections but also to provide additional capacity to
election administrators. That notwithstanding, election administration continues to impact
elections.
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The 2012 General Election
Florida has been particularly troublesome since 2000. In 2012 Florida again
showcased mismanaged elections. Floridians were still waiting to cast ballots at midnight
on Election Day in 2012 because fewer voters cast their votes during the preceding early
voting period than had in 2008. The 2008 General Election was a watershed moment for
American politics. American voters elected the U.S.’ first African-American president.
New segments of the American electorate voted in higher rates taking advantage of
expanded early voting laws. Florida, a pivotal swing-state, made early in-person voting
available to its voters only four years earlier during the 2004 election cycle. Early voting
participation increased 86.3% from 2004 to 2008, growing from approximately 1.43
million early voters in 2004 to 2.66 million early voters in 2008. Democrats, minority,
and younger voters were more likely to utilize early voting in 2008 (Herron and Smith,
2013). In 2008, demand for early voting was so great that Florida’s Governor, Republican
Charlie Crist, extended the early voting period by executive order. However, by the 2012
General Election, early voting decreased in Florida by 9.5% in 2012 shrinking down to
2.41 million early voters. What caused the drop in early voters in 2012 from 2008 when
the number of eligible voters grew by 686,812 voters during the same period?
Leading to the 2012 election cycle, Florida’s Republican leaders changed election
laws to limit early voting. HB 1355 limited voting registration and early voting; this
could have been part of an effort to standardize election administration practice across the
State of Florida (Hasen, 2014). Politics most likely provoked the changes to election law.
In Florida, the Republican Party holds majorities in both chambers of the Florida
Legislature; the Governor is a Republican as well. Republicans have sought to
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incorporate higher levels of integrity into elections and to limit illegal votes. Regulating
uniformity in election administration, like requiring that all voters present a governmentissued identification card at the polling station, is part of a strategy to control voting
outcomes. Standardizing early voting days and times also promotes uniformity. Calls for
uniformity came directly from the 2000 General Election when the United States
Supreme Court found that Florida’s election processes were not uniform during the
recount. Although the courts have found that uniformity in election administration has
often had a disproportionately negative impact on minority communities, efforts to
require uniformity persist. For example, in July of 2018 the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals
overturned a Texas Federal judge’s ruling from 2016 that blocked a Texas bill that would
require voter id for all Texas’ voters. Texas’ SB 214 will be the law again for Texas’
voters.
In 2011, many voting rights advocates like the League of Women Voters, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and various media outlets reported that the
restrictions on early voting would have a detrimental impact on early voting participation
and, consequently, overall voter turnout (see the ACLU’s, “Cutting Early Voting is Voter
Suppression”). Democrats argued that the changes were implemented to limit the early
voting advantage they gained during the 2008 General Election; Florida’s early voters
helped usher Democrat Barack Obama into the White House. Nevertheless, the Florida
Legislature approved HB 1355 in the spring of 2011; Governor Rick Scott signed the bill
into law in the summer of 2011.
Changes to election law are often subject to federal review to protect minority
voters. The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) had a requirement, dictated by
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the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA), to test the changes HB 1355 introduced to Florida’s
early voting period. The test would determine if those changes would have a retrogressive
effect on minority voter participation. Changes made by the Florida Legislature to the
election laws in 2011 required preclearance from the USDOJ. Section 5 of the VRA
covered five (5) Florida Counties – Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough, and Monroe –
because those counties had a history minority access to the polls. Those counties had to
seek “pre-clearance” of any changes to their voting laws (the Supreme Court struck the
Section 5 “preclearance” requirements finding them unconstitutional in 2013). Therefore,
changes in state election laws that impacted those counties were also subject to federal
review. The USDOJ put a freeze on the changes to the early voting times so that it could
analyze their impact on minority groups. The USDOJ initially invalidated HB 1355
because it shrank the total number of hours available for early voting from the totals
allowed in 2008. The State was able to keep HB 1355’s restrictions for early voting days
by reaching the 2008 hour total. By early 2012, the USDOJ found the new schedule of
times complied with the “preclearance” in that they did not have a discriminatory purpose
or effect. With HB 1355 clearing federal scrutiny, the new law dictated a new set of early
voting days for the 2012 General Election.
Florida’s Supervisor of Elections
With new laws in place, Florida’s election bureaucrats, the Supervisor of
Elections (SOEs) had to administer the 2012 elections. The Florida Constitution creates
Florida's SOEs. Article 8, Section 1(d) COUNTY OFFICERS of the Florida Constitution
creates Florida’s constitutional officers. “There shall be elected by the electors of each
county, for terms of four years, a sheriff, a tax collector, a property appraiser, a
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supervisor of elections, and a clerk of the circuit court; except, when provided by county
charter or special law approved by vote of the electors of the county, any county officer
may be chosen in another manner therein specified, or any county office may be
abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by general law are transferred to
another office.” Per the Florida Constitution, 66 county SOEs are elected; only MiamiDade County appoints its SOE as part of its home-rule charter. The SOEs hold four-year
terms in office. All SOEs are members of the Florida State Association of Supervisors of
Elections (FSASE) whose core mission is conducting fair, honest and accurate elections.
Although the SOE is elected (except in Miami-Dade County), the role is ministerial, and
their function is purely administrative. SOEs make no policy decisions and are required
to enforce federal and state election laws.
The new law made the climate for running the election in 2012 very politically
intense. Florida’s SOEs experienced political pressure from both higher-order elected
officials and their local constituents. From the top, state policy-makers expect the SOEs
to utilize their discretion to reinforce the party platform. At the local level, SOEs must
represent the voters in their community.
The SOEs have a political party identity. Ninety-three percent (93%) of the SOEs
in place for the 2012 General Election identified with a major party – 30 Democrats
(45%) and 33 Republicans (49%); only 4 have No Party Affiliation (6%). Figure 2.2
shows the difference in total early voters aggregated by the party identity of the SOE.
Florida is split nearly evenly with 33 Republican (REP) SOEs, 30 Democrat (DEM)
SOEs, and 4 SOEs who have No Party Affiliation (NPA). Figure 2.1 shows the total early
votes cast in the 2008 and 2012 General Elections aggregated to the party of the SOE.
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Figure 2.1. Difference of Early Voter Totals by SOE Party, 2008 & 2012

Party # SOEs

Tot. EV Votes '08

Tot. EV Votes '12

Difference

DEM

30

889,981

799,159

(90,822)

NPA

4

377,330

288,730

(88,600)

REP

33

1,394,361

1,321,208

(73,153)

Total

67

2,661,672

2,409,097

(252,575)

Early voting totals fell across the board. There is some empirical evidence that partisan
identity of the local election bureaucrats affects voter participation (Burden, Canon,
Lavertu, Mayer, & Moynihan, 2013; Burden, Canon, Mayer, & Moynihan, 2012; Kimball
& Kropf, 2006). The SOEs party identity may explain why early voting turnout was
lower in 2012. A deeper look into how SOEs may have influenced early voting is
necessary.
Early Voting Facilities
How can SOEs influence early voting participation? Florida’s SOEs have broad
discretion over early voting locations. Section 101.657 (1)(a), Florida Statutes (2012),
required that each supervisor of elections open at least one early in-person voting location
in the county at the main office of the supervisor. Outside of that requirement, SOEs are
permitted to allocate additional early voting sites at their discretion. The section provides
very clear discretionary authority to the supervisors with respect to additional early
voting locations, “The supervisor may also designate any city hall or permanent public
library facility as early voting sites; however, if so designated, the sites must be
geographically located so as to provide all voters in the county an equal opportunity to
cast a ballot, insofar as is practicable.”
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SOEs have full discretion over the number and location of early voting sites
within their respective communities. They and are only limited by the physical facilities
available to them that meet the letter of the statute – branch offices of the supervisor,
public libraries, and various city hall buildings. The sites must only be geographically
located as is “practicable” to allow for equal access. The Florida Statutes do not provide
any required metric to measure the distribution of early voting sites in any county.
Early Voting Site Changes
SOEs control the number and location of early voting sites from one election to
the next. Florida’s SOEs made 267 early voting sites available in 2008; in 2012 they
made 289 early voting sites available. Florida’s SOEs do have discretionary authority to
decide the number and location of early voting sites within their county. Bureaucrats have
ample discretion and wide latitude to allocate benefit to a preferred group (Lim 2006, p.
198). Florida’s SOEs could have allocated early voting sites in a way that preferred their
party preference of limiting early voting participation. Figure 2.2 shows how the local
SOEs changed the number of early voting facilities in their communities and the
corresponding change to the early voting participation rate (EVPR). The EVPR is the
percentage of voters who voted early of all voters who voted in that same election.
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Figure 2.2. The Percent Change in EVPR by SOE Party
Party # SOEs EV Site Changes
DEM

NPA

REP

Total

EVPR '08

EVPR '12

%Change '08-'12

30
1
23
3
1
2

-1 site
No Changes
+1 site
+2 sites
+3 sites

24.28%
37.38%
25.36%
30.78%
24.77%
17.54%

20.00%
28.60%
20.38%
27.60%
26.81%
14.57%

-17.63%
-23.48%
-19.65%
-10.32%
8.26%
-16.96%

4
3
1

No Changes
+1 site

26.11%
26.36%
24.31%

18.86%
18.17%
23.67%

-27.79%
-31.06%
-2.63%

33
1
2
20
5
4
1

-3 sites
-1 site
No Changes
+1 site
+2 sites
+3 sites

22.72%
28.26%
27.16%
21.21%
26.14%
24.74%
14.76%

20.62%
23.20%
21.30%
18.73%
25.16%
23.96%
13.52%

-9.24%
-17.91%
-21.58%
-11.69%
-3.75%
-3.17%
-8.38%

67

+22

23.66%

20.19%

-14.70%

Reading Figure 2.2, a third of Florida’s 67 local Supervisors of Elections (SOEs)
altered their early voting sites in number after the approval of the new law. Democrats
removed 1 site and added 11 sites for a net change of +10 across their counties.
Conversely, according to Figure 2.2, Republican SOEs removed 5 sites and added 16
sites for a net change of +11 sites across their counties. Figure 2.2 also provides insights
on how the changes to the number of EV sites at the county level affected EVPR.
Florida’s SOEs added 22 net new sites across the state for the 2012 General Election, yet
EVPR fell by 14.70% from 23.66% during the 2008 General Election to 20.19% in 2012.
According to the summary data in Figure 2.2, the elimination of early voting sites always
resulted in lower EVPR, irrespective of the partisan identity of the SOE. However, the
addition of sites was not as consistent as the elimination of sites; EVPR only increased in
one (1) county corresponding to the addition of early voting sites. It is important to note
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that, in all cases where the county SOE is a registered Republican, the EVPR was lower
in 2012 than in 2008.
These summary statistics showcase preliminary evidence that partisan identity of
the local SOE has an impact on the early voting participation behavior of local
constituents. Voter behavior is inconsistent with the deletion or addition of early voting
sites. Even when the total number of sites did not change, EVPR fell.
The total number of sites alone is not adequate to explain the phenomenon. In
addition to changing the number of sites, SOEs may have moved sites. SOEs showed
bureaucratic discretion by changing early voting locations. HB 1355 became law in June
2011. SOEs had the opportunity to assess the impact of the change in early voting days
would have on voters. The SOEs also had the discretion and the time to actively change
early voting facilities to respond to the new election laws. What might motivate the SOEs
to change the number and location of early voting facilities?
Research Question and Hypothesis
This dissertation seeks to uncover what caused lower early voting participation in
2012 than in 2008. SOEs have a role to play in the election process that can influence
voting participation. Was the decrease in early voting participation caused by SOEs
decisions to add or remove early voting facilities? Specifically, did SOEs, who are
registered Republicans, use their discretionary authority to alter the number and location
of early voting sites within their communities to limit early voting in tandem with their
political co-partisans? I hypothesize that if a Republican moved the location of early
voting sites in their communities for the 2012 General Election from their location in the
2008 election, then those changes will lower precinct early voting participation. The
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research follows a natural experimental design to explore the political influence of
partisan identity of local SOEs, and whether their response to politically motivated
changes in the State’s early voting election laws affected voting outcomes: the early
voting participation rate (EVPR).
Additional Research Questions and Corresponding Hypotheses
The main research question raises a sequence of ancillary questions that need to be
resolved before the main hypothesis can be properly interpreted.
1. Did the SOE comply with F.S. 101.657 and locate their early voting sites “so as to
provide all voters in the county an equal opportunity to cast a ballot” for the 2012
General Election? If voters must travel long distances, then EVPR will decrease. I
calculate the distance between the voter precinct and the nearest early voting
location for 2012 and test this independent variable.
2. When an EV site changes from one General Election to the next (a four-year
period), does that change in location have an impact on EVPR? As distance
increases from one election to the next, EVPR will decrease. I calculate the
distance between the voter precinct and the nearest early voting location for both
2008 and 2012 and calculate the difference and test this as an independent
variable.
3. Is there a difference in the way precincts early vote when the SOE is a Republican
versus a non-Republican? If the SOE is a Republican, then they will not promote
early voting. Precincts that are in Republican SOE counties will have lower
EVPR rates than other SOEs. I find the party identity of each SOE and assign the
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value to each precinct as a dummy variable where 1=Republican, and 0=nonRepublican. I test this dummy variable as an additional independent variable.
There are additional control variables that provide the necessary context for
understanding the empirical phenomenon. Each of the control variables answers
additional questions that are not the focus of this study but are nonetheless important for
the discussion. I control for Saturday and Sunday early voting since those are the only
traditional, convenient non-working days of the week. I also control for traditional
neighborhood variables, like party identity, age, years registered to vote, race, median
household income, and education and note their statistical impact on EVPR.
Summary
The Background and Questions chapter describes in further detail the scenario
driving the main question of the analysis. Florida’s voters had to wait for long periods of
time in unreasonably long lines in order cast their ballot in 2012. Early voting
participation strangely shrank for the 2012 General Election. A new election law, HB
1355, altered the availability of early voting making it less convenient. The chapter
shows that, as a response, Florida’s local election bureaucrats, the Supervisor of
Elections, may have added or removed early voting sites using their discretionary
authority. These changes may have been motivated by politics and the party identity the
SOEs carry. The chapter closes by introducing the research questions and corresponding
hypotheses.

23

CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION
Representative Democracy
The United States of America is a representative democracy. Representative
democracies allow citizens to elect their leaders in open elections to represent their
interests. Elected representatives define the laws and govern. Legislative authority alone
cannot implement and execute those laws. A vast bureaucracy implements those laws.
Career bureaucrats in various agencies of federal, state, and local government are the
working arm of government. Public administration is the management of public services.
The interaction between elected officials and public bureaucrats is of interest to
public administration research. Early on, the field of public administration found that,
normatively, public bureaucrats should manage their agencies in the interest of the public,
not expressly in the interest of politics. Since public administrators manage all levels of
government, there is a curious interplay between politicians and the bureaucracy that
manifests in many interesting ways (Meier & O’Toole, 2006).
Politics versus Bureaucracy
The reach of politics into the bureaucracy is a timeless question asked by public
administration researchers since Wilson (1887). We expect that our public bureaucrats
deliver services objectively. Bureaucracy is a paradoxical organizational structure within
a representative democracy. This paradox is particularly complicated when comparing
how the academic traditions of political science and public administration construe
bureaucracy and its place in overall public governance. Political science submits that the
wide discretion granted to bureaucrats threatens democracy; through discretion,
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bureaucrats can unduly subvert the politicians who represent the will of the people –
bureaucracy versus democracy. Public administration holds that bureaucrats must
implement policy objectively; public sector professionals can deliver citizen services in a
way that limits the reach of partisanship – politics versus bureaucracy. One tradition’s
position seemingly contradicts the other. From one perspective, bureaucracy is
undemocratic because it is outside of politics, yet paradoxically, the overreach of politics
into the bureaucracy can yield undemocratic outcomes.
“Political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining
votes” (Downs 1957, p. 137). Assume a state’s majority party passes legislation that
alters election law to gain a competitive electoral advantage; manipulation of elections in
this manner can negatively impact individual civil liberties. If state politicians change
election law for partisan gains, they signal to local-level bureaucrats to utilize their
position to reinforce that effort. Evidence suggests local bureaucrats will actively utilize
their discretion to alter administrative practices in a way that advantages their partisan
identity group (Kropf et al., 2013). In this case, political influence on election law is
clear. The discipline of public administration stands on a tradition of separation between
elected officials who make the laws, and the public bureaucrats who implement policies
in communities. This separation assumes a necessary level of independence on the part of
bureaucrats that normatively compels them to deliver services objectionably with
overarching impartiality toward political demands and a notable disassociation from
intrinsic personal interests. Burden et al. (2013) studied the objectivity of local election
officials (LEOs) across Wisconsin and claimed that those LEOs that were elected,
“…represent and pursue the preferences of the electorate” (Burden et al., 2013, p. 904).
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Burden et al. (2013) also found that partisanship of appointed LEOs who identified as
Republican did have a negative impact on voter turnout.
Representative Bureaucracy
Undoubtedly, politicians represent their partisan interests in contemplating
election law changes. We expect the bureaucrats, local election administrators, to “[lie]
outside the proper sphere of politics” (Wilson 1887, 210). What is less clear is how
politics and personally held partisan agendas influenced Florida’s 67 county election
bureaucrats, the Supervisors of Elections (SOEs), to change the number and location of
early voting sites as a response.
Representative bureaucracy is a concept Mosher (1968) introduced as an
extension of representative democracy. A representative bureaucracy has personal
characteristics that mimic segments of the public they serve – they represent the people.
According to Mosher, “A broadly representative public service, especially at the level of
leadership, suggests an open service in which access is available to most people,
whatever their station in life, and in which there is equality of opportunity” (Mosher in
Lim 2006, p. 194). Bureaucrats also hold attitudes and values that are generally
representative of the population subgroup they identify with and may use those values in
implementing policy (Kropf et al., 2013, p. 242).
Active representation is decision-making on the part of the bureaucracy that
purposely targets a specific group of citizens (Hindera, 1993, p. 419) in a manner that is
partial and purposeful (Lim, 2006, p. 194). Election administrators in the State of Florida,
the Supervisors of Elections (SOEs), are elected bureaucrats responsible for impartially
facilitating elections in each county. Under Florida law, SOEs have wide discretion to
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allocate various voting resources to the public. Having discretionary authority is critical
in the application of active representation by a bureaucrat. This study will look at how
SOEs use discretion in the allocation of early voting facilities, and how they use
discretion in response to political signals to gauge the influence of partisan politics on
bureaucratic decisions.
“Similarly, Subramaniam (1967) questions whether the bureaucracy can
adequately serve sectional and general interests. If each member of the bureaucracy
represents the sectional interests he or she reflects, the overall bureaucracy will be riddled
with conflict and ineffective at serving the can adequately serving the broad public
interest.” (Kennedy, 2014, p. 412)
There is concern that shared belief systems will motivate bureaucrats to “behave
in ways that increase the substantive benefits for their social group” (Lim, 2006, p. 195).
Bureaucrats have ample discretion and wide latitude to allocate benefit to a preferred
group (Lim, 2006, p. 198). Recent scholarship finds that local election administrators
showcase active representation of their partisan values in their actions and attitudes while
conducting their duties (Burden et al., 2013; Kimball, Kropf, & Battles, 2006; Kropf,
Vercellotti, & Kimball, 2013). When party identity motivates active representation,
politics controls the bureaucracy. Noting there are limited studies on the partisanship of
election administrators and how that impacts measurable outcomes related to voter
turnout (Kimball & Kropf, 2006, p. 1260), this study will review the dramatic changes to
Florida’s early voting laws in 2011 and the actions local Supervisors of Elections took
following those changes. This study goes further by testing how discretionary decisions
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made by the local SOEs affected the early voting participation of the local voting
constituents.
Active Representation and Partisan Identity
Did Florida’s SOEs use their discretion in siting early voting facilities in 2012 to
make it easier/harder for partisans to vote, demonstrating active representation in the
bureaucracy? Election administration provides a fertile setting for research into
representative bureaucracy and “in which to test competing theories related to
representative bureaucracy” (Kropf et al., 2013, p. 250). This is especially true of the
relationship of partisan identity and resource allocation to voters. Election administrators
could be taking actions that are actively partisan. This is the primary interest of this
research project.
Partisanship is a critical personal identity trait that can have serious implications
when it translates from passive into active representation which, “might tell us a great
deal about political control of the bureaucracy” (Meier and O’Toole 2006, p. 180).
[E]lection administration provides an important setting in which to test competing
theories related to representative bureaucracy” (Kropf et al., 2013, p. 250). For instance, a
Republican election supervisor might actively disenfranchise Democrats to limit the
opposition party’s access to participate in election contests (the converse could be true as
well) (Burden et al., 2013). Morton et al. (2008) questioned the role of the election
administrator in delivering the vote equitably. They argued that elections administrators
use their position to affect the partisan vote, assisting party affiliates and impeding
opposition voters. Using turnout from gubernatorial elections, they found a statistical
significance that correlates the party affiliation of the chief election official and the level
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of turnout for the party in general. Evidence of party allegiance and political gaming has
cast a shadow on election officers. Kimball, Kropf, and Battles (2006) found a
conditional effect of partisanship in election administration: in heavily Republican
jurisdictions with a Democratic local election official, there were fewer provisional votes
cast and counted” (Kropf et al., 2013, p. 244). Partiality is objectionable (Lim, 2006, p.
195). The ethics of all administrators of elections are forcibly called into question when
the implications of these results are shared. Unchecked outside motivations can become
“a major threat to orderly democratic government” (Mosher 1968). Voters are not
satisfied with partisanship affecting their ability to cast ballots either. Accordingly,
Alvarez et al. (2008) surveyed 1,176 voters and non-voters and concluded that there is a
preference among voters for state and local registrars that are elected, non-partisan and
who would work on a collective board. This is hardly the case as most US election
supervisors are elected partisans.
However, having a specific identity, like party affiliation, does not necessarily
mean that a decision-maker will automatically behave in favor of their identity group
(Lim, 2006, p. 194). Indeed, active representation has had beneficial effects as well.
Meier and O’Toole (2006) found that active representation of school district employees
had a positive impact on the success of Hispanic students. Advocacy still has its
opponents. “Bureaucrats cannot be allowed, as bureaucrats, to pursue their
extraorganizational commitments, however meritorious these may appear to them.” (Lim,
p. 201). Mosher considered active representation as a threat to democracy (Mosher in
Lim, 2006, p.194), and inequities in public service would result in fragmented
communities (Lim, 2006, p. 194).
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This research will look at whether partisanship was a factor in the SOE’s
decisions to change early voting locations. This research project follows what Hindera
(1993) called “second generation” studies of active representation by addressing both
elements necessary for an appropriate research design. Firstly, partisans on either side are
both the group that is representing and that which is being represented. If State laws were
meant to be punitive to specific partisan or ethnic groups, then voter participation by
those groups will fall from the 2008 General Election to the 2012 General Election. SOEs
might follow suit in allocating resources to specific groups. Secondly, the siting of early
voting sites for a jurisdiction must be both allocative and discretionary; pursuant to F.S.
101.657, SOEs had the discretion to authorize alterations to the early voting options
within their communities.
Economics of Voting
The basic tenet of economics is simple – increase the price of a good, and demand
will fall, lower it and demand will increase. Downs (1957) substantiated the economic
bases for understanding the rationale behind voting. Downs (1957) used rational choice
theory to conclude that voting is irrational. Downs (1957) explained that there are costs
and benefits to each individual voter. Downs (1957) committed his ideas to an equation.
Equation 3.1: Downs’ Equation for Voting
R = (BP) – C; where





R = reward for voting
B = the benefit of a preferred candidate winning
P = probability that one’s vote is the tie-break
C = costs to vote

The probability that a single vote will win the election is very low, so seemingly
insignificant additional costs will deter voters from participating in an election. The
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voters are rational will vote when their costs do not exceed their personal benefit. Riker
and Ordeshook (1968) extended Downs’ model to incorporate a metric that captures the
civic duty component of voting.
Equation 3.2: Riker and Ordeshook’s Equation for Voting
R = (BP) – C + D, where






R = reward for voting
B = the benefit of a preferred candidate winning
P = probability that one’s vote is the tie-break
C = costs to vote
D = satisfaction of participating in democracy

Even with Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) extension of Downs’ (1957) original model,
small disturbances in the cost to vote will dissuade voters from participating. Costs that
impact the voting decision range from overly complex procedures to the distance to a
polling location. This analysis focuses on two cost variables that can inconvenience
voters – the availability of weekend days, and the distance voters must travel. The
number and location of voting facilities added new costs for voters to absorb to vote early
in the 2012 General Election.
Economics of Bureaucracy
Models of applied microeconomics are useful for understanding the actions of
public sector actors. Public choice theory informs public policy decision-making by
providing a positivist platform for the exploration of public policy questions. The
assumptions of microeconomics are extended to the field of public administration
research. Niskanen (1971) stated that the bureaucracy functions like a private sector
enterprise. The bureaucrat replaces the entrepreneur as the necessary catalyst for the
business endeavor. Niskanen believed that the bureaucrat seeks to maximize the budget
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as the goal, unlike the entrepreneur who has a profit motive. Niskanen (1971) claimed
that the bureaucracy has an explicit budget motivation which forces them to always seek
to budget-maximize and grow its annual budget from year-to-year. The Niskanen (1971)
model showed a bureau produces inefficiently at a level that exceeds the equilibrium
point where marginal benefit meets the marginal cost.
Dunleavy (1991) reviewed the economic models of bureaucracy presented by
both Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971) and regarded them as the bedrock for exploring
the bureaucracy from an economic perspective. Dunleavy (1991) did take issue with his
predecessors’ work, questioning the basic assumptions used to dictate the motivation
behind a bureaucracy’s budget growth motivation. In his critique of Downs’ (1967)
utility function for a bureaucrat, Dunleavy remarked, “Down’s last two components –
pride in the proficient performance of work, and a commitment to specific programs –
seem objectionable for another reason. These are behavioral traits which a public choice
model of bureaucracy should be aiming to predict as likely or unlikely to occur, rather
than directly incorporating them into the model assumptions” (Dunleavy 1991, 165).
Economic Model of Early Voting Participation
It is easier to express the early voting cost phenomenon as an economic model
that explains different impacts to participation, displayed here as Figure 3.1. The
consumers are the voters. Demand represents the voters who want to participate in the
election during early voting. The producers are the SOEs; they supply early voting to the
voting consumer. The SOEs have production costs associated with each early voting site
that is consistent with canonical economic production – land, labor, and capital. Land
consists of the physical sites that can be used for an election polling location. F.S 101.657
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limited early voting sites to branch offices of the Supervisor of Elections, public libraries,
or City Halls. Those options are limited. Labor consists of the temporary workers that are
called into work during the early voting period. They may be temporary staff, but often
they are pollworkers; neither are volunteers and are paid for their time. Capital consists of
voting machines, voting booths, and technology. The technology used during the early
voting period is very expensive. The SOE staff that is working a given early voting
location must have the ability to verify the eligibility of every voter that wishes to cast a
ballot. To facilitate voting before Election Day, early voting locations must have
computers that are directly connected to the state’s registration network that can confirm
whether the voter is a valid voter, and configure the correct ballot for the voter. Pursuant
to 98.0981, F.S. Ballots can be very different from one another. Each precinct ballot-ondemand printers supply is a function of the days allowed under Florida Statute and the
number of sites (as defined by the local SOE). Price is the convenience “cost” the voter
absorbs to participate in the election; quantity represents the number of people who
participate in early voting. Assume that the 2008 General Election is equilibrium. 2008
saw the largest turnout in any election in Florida’s history. The election ran very
smoothly, and there were no reports of excessive wait times for voters. Figure 3.1 is an
efficient model of the early voting market.
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Figure 3.1. Proposed Economic Model of Early Voting in Equilibrium

I assume supply efficiently met demand in 2008.
HB 1355, passed in 2011, imposed limitations to the number of days early voting
could be held effectively limits the supply of early voting alternatives. As illustrated in
Figure 3.2, the new regulation limits supply and creates inefficiency in the market. As a
result, cost increases from C to C2 resulting in additional costs to voters and to election
administrators; quantity falls from Q to Q2 creating a shortage. Both the consumers (the
voters) and the producers (SOEs) absorb the costs of the “tax”. People pay by waiting.
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Figure 3.2. Economic Model of State Reduction of Early Voting Days

The next economic model shows the interplay of decision-making at the state and
local levels. As a response, local SOEs can, through their statutory authority, reconfigure
early voting sites at their own discretion. Both sets of decision-makers, state politicians,
and local SOEs have the capacity to add and remove costs to voters.
A dynamic model helps illustrate the discretionary response of the various SOEs.
Figure 3.3 shows how the model changes if the local SOE adds early voting sites to their
community. If the local SOE added sites after the imposition of the “tax”, the cost to
voters falls from C2 to C3a and more demand, from Q2 to Q3a, is met.
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Figure 3.3. Economic Model of Sites Added

Figure 3.4 shows how the model changes if the local SOE removes early voting
sites from their community. If the local SOE removed sites after the imposition of the
“tax”, the cost increases from C2 to C3b with less demand, from Q2 to Q3b, captured
If the local SOE removed sites after the imposition of the “tax”, then they would have
effectively raised the cost to vote. This disturbance should be enough to dissuade voters
from participating in the election because there was an even greater shortage of
convenient early voting options.
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Figure 3.4. Economic Model of Sites Removed
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Accessibility Factors Affecting Voting Behaviors
Consistent with Downs (1957), Lacombe et al. (2012) found that small
disturbances in the environment and timing around casting a vote will sway whether a
person participates in an election. This study follows closely the work of Gimpel &
Schuknecht’s (2003) non-market valuation of the cost of voting as expressed by
transportation costs to vote. Their analysis used GIS and a spatial lag regression model to
demonstrate that increased distance adds cost to voting and that increased distance from a
residential neighborhood to a polling site can depress turnout. This research explores the
direct and indirect effects of a series of demographic, distance, and action variables on
turnout.
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The individual decision to vote or abstain is influenced by both intergroup and
intragroup relations (Schram 1991). There are interactions within and between voters, so
much so that those spatial interactions must be accounted for to model voting
participation accurately. In their analysis, Lacombe et al. (2012) suggest that a Spatial
Durbin Error Model (SDEM) is better for exploring issues of voter turnout. The
particularities of the model will be discussed in the Methods section.
Voting Turnout
The federal government does not run US elections. Many other international
countries have a federal election body. They also have a higher turnout. According to
research released by the Pew Research Center in 2017, the US is ranked 27th in overall
voter turnout percentage in comparison to its peer democracies in the most recent
elections; Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark had turnout rates over 80% of their voting age
population, while the US had only 55.7% percent turnout in 2016 (Pew Research Center,
2017).
Previous studies of voter turnout have looked at the spatial aspect of voter turnout
to assess the impact of administrative decisions. Studies by Gimpel & Schuknecht (2003)
and Dyck & Gimpel (2005) took a geographic approach to analyze access to voting.
Dyck & Gimpel (2005) used a multinomial logistic regression (MNLM) that includes
distance to polls and demographic characteristics to predict voter turnout by type:
absentee, early, precinct and non-voting.
Dyck, Gaines, & Shaw (2009) found that convenience voters thus tend to be
better informed, older, more partisan, and more psychologically attached to the political
system” (Dyck, Gaines, & Shaw, 2009, p. 1091); it is necessary to control for the
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education and income level of these locales. Less obviously, within states, there is
geographic variation in the implementation of laws at the county level. Dyck et al. (2009)
also found that the number of migrants in an area depressed convenience voting. To
control for this aspect of the limited information, I only include voters who were in the
FVRS system for both elections. Unlike Dyck, Gaines, & Shaw (2009), I use the precinct
as the neighborhood instead of the Census tract.
Ansolabehere (2006) studied the effect of polling places on voter participation
from the 2000 General Election. The Census Current Population Survey (CPS) asked
citizens what caused them to participate or not in 2000. He postulated if racial and ethnic
minorities encountered long lines or inferior technology they would not vote, and this
would be significant (Ansolabehere, 2006, p. 205). What he found was that race did not
matter and that everyone had problems with registration and polling places
(Ansolabehere, 2006, p. 208). He also found that covered jurisdictions did no worse than
those not-covered by Section 5 of the VRA. He concludes that the VRA and other efforts
to expand the franchise have worked. His study of CPS data found no relation between
demographic variables and barriers to voting (Ansolabehere, 2006, p. 219).
EV (in-person) changes the dynamic of pitting neighborhoods against one-another
for limited resources. EV allows for voters to find the most convenient location to vote;
the most convenient location may not be near their residence, but their place of work, or a
child’s school, etc. Precinct-based voting exacerbates racial and ethnic divisions that
derive from our history of development. So, for instance, because black people live in
neighborhoods together, they will be required to vote together. White people tend to live
close together as well. White people also vote in higher rates than minorities. Since white
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people tend to have higher turnout, they will be allocated more resources for a precinctbased election. If a precinct tends to have low turnout, very little resources will be
allocated to those precincts. But, if turnout is unexpectedly high (a minority candidate is
on the ballot), there will not be enough time to respond, so minority voters will be
required to wait longer and not be able to vote at all.
EV also promotes intergroup contact. People from different racial, ethnic and
socio-economic statuses should interact more. This is the basis for integrated schools
(Brown vs. Board of Education). Normatively, should SOEs advance active
representation by promoting integration and equity at the polls? Indeed, intergroup
contact theory, from the psychology and sociology literature, suggests that the
interaction of different racial groups would begin to alter perceptions of racial prejudice
among groups.
Intergroup contact theory was first described by Gordon Allport in 1954 and was
applied to the study of school integration by Pettigrew (1975). There are four key
conditions, easily met during an election, in which intergroup contact can truly occur in
a situation when: 1)Equal status – all groups have an expectation and perception that
they are on level ground; 2) Common goals – all groups meet to share an experience in
the same capacity; 3) Intergroup cooperation – groups work together to reach a
common outcome, without competition; 4) Support of authorities, law or custom – the
interaction must be situated within a governing structure (Pettigrew, 1998, pp. 67–68).
Changing some the voting locations from one election to the next, while leaving
other locations consistent, creates a natural social experiment (Brady & McNulty 2011).
Physical distance changes might be impactful, but other lingering effects of structural
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neighborhood racial and ethnic segregation might influence voter behavior. Barreto et al.
(2009) found that the quality of the polling facility and its location within a neighborhood
has an impact on turnout. They found that lower quality polling locations are found more
often in low-income and minority neighborhoods. The negative appearance of the voting
facility, both from its exterior and interior, factor into the depression of voter turnout of
those precinct voters that are directed to cast their ballots within those facilities.
Normatively, governments should look for opportunities to maximize efficiency,
equity, and interaction of its population. EV is an efficient use of resources because it
takes advantage of economies of scale; many voters can be served in one location. EV is
equitable because everyone can have similar access to the same level of resources (not
pitting neighborhoods against one-another). EV promotes interactivity because it allows
for different people to share the same space at a specific moment in time in a place that
they feel is most convenient for them.
Summary
The Theoretical and Empirical Foundation chapter introduces the
politics/bureaucracy divide that causes friction in a representative democracy. The
discretionary action of local bureaucrats can undercut the decisions of elected politicians
who represent the will of the electorate.
Local discretion can be motivated by partisan identity through active
representation. Active representation is decision-making on the part of the bureaucracy
that purposely targets a specific group of citizens (Hindera, 1993, 419) in a manner that is
partial and purposeful (Lim, 2006, 194). If those actions are motivated by political
interests, local bureaucrats can promote public policy that is injurious to their citizens.

41

Empirically, public policy that adds costs to voting will dissuade voters from
participating in an election. Simple economic models explain how voters decide to vote
and how changes to election law change the cost structure to participation. The economic
costs of voting, as understood through distance metrics, is well documented. The chapter
concludes by describing the inherent inequities built into voting participation and how
voters calculate the cost impacts of distance and quality of voting locations in their
decision to vote.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES
Data Sources
The data I use comes from the Florida Department of State Division of Elections.
Florida has very broad and open public records laws. Pursuant to Chapter 119, Florida
Statutes, all records captured by all of Florida’s government agencies during the normal
conduct of official business are available for inspection and copy by the public; the
information must be provided in its original format. The main data for this analysis is the
Florida Voter Registration System (FVRS) maintained by the Florida Division of
Elections (DOE); the data is subject to the provisions of Chapter 119. The 2002 Help
America Vote Act (HAVA 2002) mandated that each state create a uniform voter
database. The State of Florida released its version of the statewide database in 2005. The
statewide system standardized the information for each voter between counties; for
instance, prior to the creation of the FVRS some counties assigned voters a six (6) digit
voter identification number, while other counties used a nine (9) digit number. Each
Florida county now shares its data directly with the DOE.
The dataset is a cross-sectional snapshot in time of the voter roll. The FVRS data
contains information on each registered voter including, party affiliation, ethnicity, age,
gender, residence address, voting activity, voter ID number, etc. The statewide voter roll
is available on digital video disc (DVD) by written request to the Division of Elections.
The DVD contains tab-delimited text files of the voter records for each voter in the State
by Florida county. There are sixty-seven (67) tables of voter records and an additional
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sixty-seven (67) tables with the corresponding voter history. I acquired a copy of the data
that reflected Florida’s voter rolls as of January 2014.
The FVRS data set is very large. The voter list I obtained for this study contains
12,748,023 individual voter records with another 51,169,284 records in the voter history
tables. The data is in a raw, relatively unusable format. Fortunately, the data is very well
organized into individual files for each county. For initial data preparation, I created a
relational database in Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL). MSSQL is a relational database
management system (RDBMS) software. An RDBMS allows users to combine datasets,
aggregate data, and filter data based on defined criteria; an RDBMS is especially good at
managing data with many records.
Relationships are created when two tables are “matched” on a common data point.
Usually, that data point is a unique identifier in each data table that allows for data
queries. Each voter record has a unique VOTER ID number which is like a social security
number. Data carry rich geographic markers that social scientists, who now benefit from
intelligent software and stronger computing, can analyze for spatiotemporal effects. The
database I created matched voters to their voting records allowing for speedy searches,
and facilitated geoprocessing within ArcGIS. After combining voters to their voting
records, I geocoded each voter record to create a statewide spatial dataset of voters.
Unit of Analysis – Precincts
The unit of analysis is the precinct. Precincts are the geographical, political units
used for assigning groups of residents together who share common elected
representatives. Precincts are neighborhoods and can be thought of as analogous to
Census block groups. Pursuant to 100.001 (1), Florida Statutes (2012), precincts must
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exhaustively cover the entire geography of each county. Each precinct boundary must be
mutually exclusive from its neighbor with no overlapping boundary lines; a voter can
only reside in one precinct in one county. A precinct is also the management used by the
SOE to facilitate election planning and delivery. Figure 4.1 presents the precinct totals
for each county.
Figure 4.1. Precinct Totals by County
County Precinct Count Total Voters

Average Size

Total

5,767

12,732,725

2,208

ALA
BAK
BAY
BRA
BRE
BRO
CAL
CHA
CIT
CLA
CLL
CLM
DAD
DES
DIX
DUV
ESC
FLA
FRA
GAD
GIL
GLA
GUL
HAM
HAR
HEN
HER
HIG
HIL
HOL
IND
JAC
JEF

63
9
44
14
159
576
15
79
31
47
63
24
786
15
10
199
79
23
8
25
10
13
9
8
12
10
37
25
346
8
37
14
15

173,773
14,872
123,208
16,617
401,673
1,183,996
8,850
128,291
104,870
141,515
214,015
37,758
1,362,157
16,663
10,355
601,090
219,533
77,377
7,917
30,378
11,044
6,831
10,055
8,340
12,780
18,016
132,912
66,059
807,699
11,651
103,418
29,994
9,506

2,758
1,652
2,800
1,187
2,526
2,056
590
1,624
3,383
3,011
3,397
1,573
1,733
1,111
1,036
3,021
2,779
3,364
990
1,215
1,104
525
1,117
1,043
1,065
1,802
3,592
2,642
2,334
1,456
2,795
2,142
634

County Precinct Count Total Voters Average Size
LAF
5
4,564
913
LAK
103
218,340
2,120
LEE
127
414,170
3,261
LEO
130
200,118
1,539
LEV
13
26,953
2,073
LIB
8
4,509
564
MAD
11
12,127
1,102
MAN
99
226,776
2,291
MON
33
60,408
1,831
MRN
127
237,658
1,871
MRT
31
111,071
3,583
NAS
16
57,411
3,588
OKA
52
149,595
2,877
OKE
11
19,683
1,789
ORA
227
762,930
3,361
OSC
70
186,342
2,662
PAL
703
904,840
1,287
PAS
111
324,611
2,924
PIN
296
665,678
2,249
POL
167
372,831
2,233
PUT
39
47,431
1,216
SAN
41
124,529
3,037
SAR
100
292,942
2,929
SEM
80
290,068
3,626
STJ
46
166,285
3,615
STL
62
186,338
3,005
SUM
28
81,875
2,924
SUW
16
26,254
1,641
TAY
14
13,159
940
UNI
13
7,140
549
VOL
126
355,226
2,819
WAK
12
19,139
1,595
WAL
21
43,420
2,068
WAS
16
15,091
943
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In total there are 5,767 precincts across Florida’s sixty-seven (67) counties in the
dataset. These precincts are the sample-set for the analysis. Average precinct sizes range
from 525 voters in Glades County to 3,626 voters in Seminole County. Lafayette County
has the fewest total precincts with only 5; Miami-Dade County has 786 precincts overall
– the most of any county. Since each voter’s precinct assignment is noted in the tabular
data, creating precinct geography based on the individually geocoded voter records is
simple.
The unit of analysis for the research is the precinct, but the tabular version of the
data does not allow for geospatial methods. This research uses advanced geospatial
techniques to determine the impact of policy decisions on voter turnout. I turned the
tabular data into spatial data by using geoprocessing in ArcGIS. I took the individual
voter, geocoded them to an address, and aggregated them into their precincts.
Geocoding Voter Records
Geocoding is a process that matches addresses from one data table to another data
table that is spatially enabled. The US Census provides street network data for all states
and counties which is useful for geocoding. The Census TIGER line data can be used as
an input to create an address locator. The Census polyline data consists of digital linework with corresponding data that represent real city street segments. Each street
segment has an appropriate range of addresses. The polyline data (and corresponding data
table) are input into a tool that takes each line segment and interpolates an (X, Y)
coordinate for a given point along each line. The road data can be used to create a
geocoding database. All sixty-seven counties have a corresponding Census TIGER line
data set for its road network. In total, there are over 1.3 million line-segments in the
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TIGER line file for the State of Florida. These files must be downloaded and merged to
allow for appropriate geocoding. Merging data allows for multiple geographic datasets to
be combined and analyzed as one. After merging the files, I created an address locator
from the combined road network. The address locator allows the geocoding of the tabular
data. The GIS software located over twelve (12) million voter records across the roughly
1.3 million line-segments.
Although I created a spatial representation of each voter, an aggregate version of
the voter records is more valuable to this study. I prefer the precinct as the unit of
analysis over the individual voter since precincts allow for the simpler integration of
additional traditional neighborhood variables into the overall dataset that are not found in
the FVRS data. After the geocoding process completes, each voter record becomes a
point on the map.
Using the geocoded voter records, I find the mean geographic center for each
group of voters based on their precinct assignment. The mean center is the mean
geographic distance on both the horizontal and vertical axes between many clustered
points that share a common identity variable. ArcGIS has a tool in the spatial statistics
toolbox, Mean Center, which makes the calculation of the geographic average of the
input dataset straightforward. Since each geocoded voter record has a unique precinct
assignment, I can calculate the mean center of every voter cluster for a precinct. This
center point allows for distance calculations.
Early Voting Sites
The Florida Division of Elections keeps the list of early voting locations for each
Florida County on its website. The lists for 2008 and 2012 are available in PDF. I
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converted the data into a flat-file table in Excel. I standardized the two lists to make them
usable in the GIS environment. I then geocode the lists to create a dataset of the 267 early
voting locations for 2008 and the 289 early voting locations for 2012. Once the precincts
and early voting sites are accurately placed on the map, finding the distance between
them is simple. Using the (X, Y) coordinates of the mapped data, I calculate the
rectilinear distance (also known as taxicab distance, or Manhattan block distance)
between the precinct centroid and the nearest early voting location. Both Shucknecht
(2003) and Dyck & Gimpel (2005) used Manhattan block-distances to estimate the effect
of distance on voter turnout. McNulty et. Al. (2009) analyzed five different distance
measurements to test their effect on model accuracy; they found that simple estimation
techniques, like the Manhattan block calculation, are best for social science researchers to
utilize since, “They provide parsimony in computation and explanation” (McNulty et al.,
p. 20, 2009).
The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the early voting percentage rate, abbreviated as EVPR.
The EVPR represents the proportion of the voters who cast an in-person early voting
ballot as compared to all voters who participated in the 2012 General Election.
ln(EVPR) = Early voters2012/ Voters2012
The EVPR is different from voter turnout which is a ratio of all voters who voted in an
election as a proportion of those who were eligible to vote in that election. The EVPR
allows for an analysis of the effect of the changes in law and discretionary activity. The
model uses a log-transformed dependent variable.
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Understanding the Effect of Distance
I hypothesize that distance from the precinct to the early voting location impacts
the early voting participation rate. Furthermore, I believe when that distance changes
between elections, EVPR will change in response. It is important to isolate those
precincts whose nearest early voting location changed. Of the 5,767 precincts, 1,270
precincts (22% overall) had their nearest early voting location moved. 1,270 precincts
saw their nearest early voting location move between 2008 and 2012. Of those precincts
whose early voting locations moved, 854 precincts saw their nearest early voting site
move further away, while 416 precincts saw their nearest early voting site get closer. On
average, the nearest early voting sites got further away by one mile.
Map 4.1. Example of Distance to Nearest EV Site
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Map 4.1 represents how the distance calculation is calculated. Voters in Leon
County’s Precinct 5251, represented by the blue star, had to travel approximately 8 miles
to reach the closest early voting facility during the 2008 General Election. The early
voting participation rate (EVPR) for precinct 5251 in 2008 was 21.8%.
Map 4.2. Example of Shortened Distance to Nearest EV Site

Map 4.2 is an example of a precinct whose early voting location got closer to the
center of the neighborhood in 2012 from 2008. Before the 2012 General Election, the
SOE added a new site to the county. Voters in precinct 5251 only had to travel 0.6 miles
to reach the nearest early voting location. The early voting participation rate (EVPR) for
precinct 5251 was 47.3%. Voters in Leon County’s Precinct 5251 responded to the
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change. The early voting participation rose by 117% as the distance (cost) to the nearest
early voting site fell by nearly 7.5 miles.
In contrast, voters in Sarasota County’s precinct 319 had to travel approximately
4 miles to reach the closest early voting facility during the 2008 General Election. The
early voting participation rate (EVPR) for precinct 319 in 2008 was 31.3%.
Map 4.3. Example of Lengthened Distance to Nearest EV Site

Map 4.3 shows the distance a precinct needed to travel before its nearest early
voting location changed. Voters in this Sarasota County precinct, number 319, had to
travel 4 miles to reach the closest early voting site in 2008. Before the 2012 General
Election, the Sarasota County SOE removed the site nearest to Precinct 319, forcing
voters to commute over 8 miles to the nearest site in 2012.
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Map 4.4 shows how voters in Precinct 319 had to travel approximately 8.8 miles
to reach the nearest early voting location during the 2012 General Election. The early
voting participation rate (EVPR) for precinct 319 was 16.9% in the 2008 General
Election. Early voting participation for precinct 319 was only 9.1% in the 2012 General
Election. As the distance to the nearest EV site increased over 4.7 miles, early voting
participation fell by 46%.
Map 4.4. Example of Lengthened Distance to Nearest EV Site

The two illustrated examples from Leon County, Florida and Sarasota Florida
show how changes to a precinct’s nearest early voting location can impact early voting
participation – when the early voting facility moves closer to the precinct, the early
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voting participation rate increases; when the early voting facility gets further away, the
early voting participation rate decreases.
Independent Variables
The explanatory variables include: distance to the nearest EV site, the distance
difference to the nearest EV site from the 2008 General Election to the 2012 General
Election, the SOE’s party affiliation (dummy, where 1=Republican, and
0=Democrat/NPA), the SOE’s party affiliation interacted with the distance differences,
the percentage of voters early voting on Sunday, and the percentage of voters early voting
on the last day. The control variables include ethnicity, age, gender, median household
income, education levels, and number of years registered to vote. Figure 4.2 shows the
variables, their definition and measurement, treatment, and respective sources. Seven of
the control variables are log transformed so that the elasticity of EVPR to each variable is
identifiable. The variables have coefficients that represent the elasticity of EVPR as it
pertains to that variable. Five (5) of the variables represent the semi-elasticity of EVPR.
Two (2) are dummy variables.
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Figure 4.2. Variable Matrix
VARIABLES

DEFINITION & MEASUREMENT

TREATMENT

SOURCE

DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Early voting
percentage rate
(EVPR)

The EVPR represents the proportion of the
continuous/log
voters in the precinct who cast an in-person
transformed
early voting ballot of all votes cast in the 2012
General Election.

FVRS; Martinez 2018

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Explanatory Variables
distance between a precinct centroid and the
nearest early voting location (meters)

continuous

Florida DOS/DOE;
Martinez 2018

Nearest EV Site Dist difference in distance to the nearest early
Diff '08-'12
voting site between 2008 and 2012 (meters)

continuous

Martinez 2018

Nearest EV Site Dist

SOE is REP

indicator of the partisan identity of a
precinct's SOE

dummy: 1=Rep; FSASE Dirctory;
0=Not Rep
Martinez 2018

SOE REP interact
Dist Diff '08-'12

distance difference when SOE is a Republican
interaction
(meters)

Martinez 2018

Percent Sunday

percentage of the voters who voted on the
available Sunday in 2012

continuous/log
transformed

FVRS; Martinez 2018

Percent Last Day

percentage of the voters who voted on the
available Sunday in 2012

continuous/log
transformed

FVRS; Martinez 2018

Percent EV 2008
General Election

lagged dependent variable – percent EV
participation in 2008 General

continuous/log
transformed

FVRS; Martinez 2018

Percent Dems

percentage registered Democrats to all voters continuous/log
in the precinct
transformed

FVRS; Martinez 2018

Percent Female

percentage registered voters who are female in continuous/log
the precinct
transformed

FVRS; Martinez 2018

Percent Black

percentage registered AA voters to all voters
in the precinct

FVRS; Martinez 2018

Percent Educated

percentage of the population over 25 that has continuous/log
a Bachelor's degree or higher
transformed

US Census ACS;
Martinez 2018

Median Household
Income

the median household income for the
neighborhood

continuous

US Census ACS;
Martinez 2018

Average Age

the average age of the precinct's population

continuous

FVRS; Martinez 2018

Average years
registered to vote

the average length of time a precinct's voters
have been registered to vote

continuous

FVRS; Martinez 2018

Exploratory Variables

Control Variables
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continuous/log
transformed

Figure 4.3 provides the summary statistics for the independent variables.
Figure 4.3. Summary Statistics

Variable

Median

Nearest EV Site Dist (miles)
Nearest EV Site Dist Diff '08-'12 (miles)
SOE is REP
SOE REP interact Dist Diff '08-'12 (miles)
Percent Sunday
Percent Last Day
Percent EV 2008 General Election
Percent Dems
Percent Female
Percent Black
Percent Educated
Median Household Income (USD)
Average Age
Average years registered to vote

Mean

3.29
4.45
0
-0.25
0
0.46
0
-0.14
9.7%
9.8%
16.0%
15.7%
30.6%
28.3%
37.9%
38.7%
52.7%
52.8%
6.4%
6.1%
98.2%
96.3%
$ 48,313 $ 53,668
51.8
53.2
15.1
15.2

Precinct Geography
The mean center points represent the precincts in a way that is useful for distance
calculations but are not wholly sufficient as an input for further geospatial analysis. The
spatial methods I used for this analysis (explained in detail in the subsequent chapter)
require polygon as input geography. Polygon shapes that represent Florida’s precincts do
not exist. Savas (1968) showed how GIS could be used to draw efficient precincts. I
created new precinct geography will by converting the precinct center points into
Voronoi tessellated polygons. Voronoi polygons are geometric shapes that exhaustively
cover a two-dimensional plane (Wade & Sommer, 2006). With a given a center point,
here the center of the population in a voting precinct, a shape is extruded in all directions
along the X/Y axes where any random point within the final polygon is closer to the
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given center point than it is to any other center point in the spatial data frame. This
precinct geography is projected in a coordinate system. Map 4.5 shows an example of
Voronoi tessellated polygons for Hillsborough County, Florida built around the precinct
center points.
Map 4.5. Precinct Fabric for Hillsborough County, Florida Area

Map 4.5 is an example of a large county in the state that has over 340 precincts.
Map 4.6 represents the whole tessellated precinct fabric of 5,767 geometries for the entire
State of Florida. There are clear concentrations around Florida’s major cities, like the
Miami metro area in South Florida, Tampa on the west coast, Orlando in Central Florida,
Jacksonville in the northeast, and the capital of Tallahassee.
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Map 4.6. Precinct Fabric for the State of Florida

The precinct polygon fabric is necessary for uncovering the implicit spatial
interactions between neighborhoods at this large geographic scale. Spatial regressions
require that the spatial interaction is defined by naming the neighbors of a target
observation. Each neighbor has a corresponding effect on the target. Neighbors are
defined by their proximity to the target. Neighbors may be based on distance or nearness.
I use a proximity measure that defines neighbors based on their contiguity with the target.
This analysis uses first-order queen contiguity as the basis for defining neighbors. For a
given target geography whose dependent and independent variables will serve as the
basis for a discrete observation, there is an unknown number of neighbors that might
impact the outcomes in the target. Each target has neighbors that are comprised of those
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precincts that have a contiguous side or vertex that is coincident with the target. Map 4.7
shows how this works. A target precinct, outlined in blue, has nine (9) neighbors based
on the number of shared sides and vertices the target has with adjacent polygons.
Map 4.7. A Precinct Neighborhood using Queen-Contiguity

Summary
The Data and Operationalization of the Variables chapter introduces the sources
of data, the unit of analysis, the dependent, and independent variables. This chapter also
spends time explaining the ways geography, in terms of distance and proximity, become
important to the analysis.
The main data source for this dissertation is the Florida Voter Registration
System, or FVRS, dataset. The dataset contains over 12 million voter records that are
combined with another 51 million records of voting history data. That data is geocoded,
or placed on a digital map with assigned coordinates. Those points are aggregated into
neighborhood geographies, precincts, for further study.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODS
Research Design
The social sciences ask questions about human behavior and interaction without
always respecting influences that affect a social phenomenon, like space and time
(LeSage, 2014). Any social phenomenon is simply the manifestation of people taking
actions within a certain place at a specific time; place provides the backdrop for
interaction, while time provides contextual color. Human behavior is intrinsically
spatiotemporal – belonging to both space and time. Therefore, empirical explorations of
any social phenomenon should explore its fundamental spatiotemporal aspects to
understand fully how that phenomenon manifests. The discipline of public administration
has yet to integrate spatiotemporal elements into empirical policy research. The spacetime principle drives the methodology of this study.
How can researchers in the social sciences better integrate methods into their
academic work that respect the spatiotemporal aspects of a social phenomenon?
Geographic Information Science (GIS – an acronym that also refers to geographic
information systems) provides methods and tools for geospatial analysis that allow for a
richer understanding of space-time. GIS provides both the framework and software for
managing and exploring the spatial elements of data. GIS allows researchers to map
datasets. Researchers in political science have effectively used GIS and spatial statistics
to explore voting participation behavior because voting behavior is particularly spatial in
nature. I use various tools within a GIS to reveal the spatial aspects of my research
questions. I use the GIS techniques of geocoding, geographic transformations, pattern
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analysis, distance calculations, and spatial regressions to understand what affects early
voting participation.
Space must be revealed as part of the data analysis. Recall, voters will participate
in an election event when the cost to vote (real or perceived) is smaller than the benefit
(also real or perceived). Part of the cost to vote is the distance a voter must travel to cast
their ballot; proximity to a voting location is a facet of the spatial aspect of voting. The
distance a voter must travel to a voting facility is an explicit cost that affects voting
behavior. But there are implicit and underlying spatial interactions of a social
phenomenon that go beyond a single variable making them more vital to uncover. Spatial
econometric models find that each observation will impact its neighbors in a spill-over
effect. Observations influence one another because they cannot be contained unto
themselves. A reasonable starting point for the design of a public policy analysis relies on
a traditional ordinary least squares (linear) regression on the data, per Equation 5.1.
Equation 5.1: Ordinary Least Squares
𝑦 = 𝛼𝚤𝑁 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀
OLS tests the impact of an independent variable on a dependent variable. The
ordinary least squares (OLS) model is the most specific regression model. Cross-sectional
data is prone to spatial autocorrelation which demonstrably violates the requirements of
randomness, or independently and identically distributed variables, i.i.d.
Spatial Econometric Modeling
Spatial econometric models expand the traditional ordinary least squares
regression model by integrating spatial variables. Expanding the regression models to
respect the spatial structure of cross-sectional data is necessary. The econometric models

60

that impart spatial features into the analysis can control for violations of i.i.d. under the
assumption that observable features of a given phenomenon interact in ways that require
incorporation into any regression model. Researchers must rely on their knowledge
around the given phenomenon they study, and how it particularly manifests, to ascertain
whether spatial interactions are relevant to the question at hand.
Recall that traditional linear regression models poorly represent cross-sectional
data because cross-sectional data is prone to spatial-autocorrelation. The models used in
spatial regression consider the inherent spatial aspects of cross-sectional data. Each
spatial regression model requires that space is integrated. Each model has some spatial
interaction term. Those terms represent spillover effects from one region to the next. The
spillovers can be local or global, or a mix of both. This could be a spatially lagged
dependent variable, independent variable, error term, or some combination of the three.
LeSage (2014) showed that OLS models are inappropriate for applied work that
uses data that is obviously spatial in nature. LeSage (2014) also suggested that there is no
reason to spend time proving OLS is ineffective in modeling a spatial phenomenon.
LeSage (2014) proposed a series of principles for applied econometric analyses. LeSage’s
(2014) Second Principle states that, “[T]here are only two model specifications worth
considering for applied work” (LeSage, 2014, p. 10) – the Spatial Durbin Model and the
Spatial Durbin Error Model.
Nevertheless, I ran six models to determine which best represents the data. The
unit of analysis is the voting precinct. The data-set has an overall sample size is 5,767.
Each model uses the same independent variable and mix of dependent variables. This
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analysis will test the percentage of the voters who early vote to see if there is a noticeable
effect of the day or distance on voter turnout among the other variables.
OLS is a non-spatial and is the baseline for model comparison in this chapter. The
other five (5) models incorporate space in the independent variables, the error term, a
spatially lagged dependent variable, or some mix of the three. The five (5) models are the
1) SLX – spatial lag X – model incorporates, for a given independent variable, the
average of the values of the independent variables for an observation’s neighbors; 2)
SLM – spatial lag model – incorporates the average of the dependent variable for an
observation’s neighbors; 3) SEM – spatial error model – incorporates the average of the
error for the neighbors; 4) SDM – spatial Durbin model – incorporates the average of the
independent variable for an observation’s neighbors; SDEM – spatial Durbin Error model
– incorporates the average of the independent variables for the neighbors and a spatially
weighted error term. Figure 5.1 shows the generic equation for various models I tested
using the cross-sectional of data.
Figure 5.1. Generic Equations of the Regression Models
OLS
SLX
SLM
SEM
SDM
SDEM
OLS = Ordinary Least Squares

SEM = Spatial Error Model

SLX = Spatial Lag X

SDM = Spatial Durbin Model

SLM = Spatial Lag Model

SDEM = Spatial Durbin Error Model

Selecting an appropriate model that depicts the actual empirical scenario requires a
modeling exercise that estimates and tests different models for cross-comparison of
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model parameters. Four model parameters provide the statistics necessary to review,
contrast, compare, and ultimately judge model performance. Models can be judged on the
Akaike information criterion (AIC), log-likelihood, Schwarz criterion, and standard error.
The best performing model maximizes or minimizes the value of each of the model
parameters. Figure 5.1 indicates how each model parameter should be judged.
Figure 5.2. Model Parameter Optimization Goals
Parameter
Akaike Inforation Criterion (AIC)
Log likelihood
Schwarz criterion
Standard error

Goal
minimize
maximize
minimize
minimize

Figure 5.2. compares the model parameter outputs for the six models. Each model uses
the same dependent and independent variables, only varying according to how the model
incorporates space. The outputs are derived from the Geoda statistical software package
(Anselin, Syabri, & Kho,2006).
Figure 5.3. Model Parameter Comparison

Parameter
Akaike Inforation Criterion (AIC)
Log likelihood
Schwarz criterion
Standard error

OLS
397.3
-183.7
497.2
0.2498

SLX
71.4
-6.7
264.6
0.2423

Model Type
SLM
SEM
-610.2
-1104.4
321.1
567.2
-503.6
-1004.5
0.2265
0.2105

SDM
-1136.5
598.2
-936.7
0.2119

SDEM
-1188.4
625.2
-1250.3
0.0146

OLS = Ordinary Least Squares

SEM = Spatial Error Model

SLX = Spatial Lag X

SDM = Spatial Durbin Model

SLM = Spatial Lag Model

SDEM = Spatial Durbin Error Model

The spatial models improve upon the OLS in every category. The SDEM has the best
model parameters. The SDEM flipped the sign of the AIC, log-likelihood, and Schwarz
criterion in the desired directions. Reviewing the parameters across models reveals
diminishing returns on model specification. The SDEM is preferred for its model

63

parameter statistics, and its ability to model global disturbances and local spillover
effects.
Equation 5.2. presents the specific equation this analysis using the OLS model.
Equation 5.2 – Specific Form of the Ordinary Least Squares Model
log(EVPR 2012) = α + β1*(Nearest EV Site Dist) + β2*(Nearest EV Site Dist Diff’08‘12) + β3*(SOE is REP) + β4*(SOE REP interact Dist Diff ’08-‘12) +
β5*log(%Sunday) + β6*log(%Last Day) + β7*log(%EV 2008 GE) +
β8*log(%Democrats) + β9*log(%Female) + β10*log(%Black) +
β11*log(%Educated) + β12*(Med. HH Inc) + β13*(Avg. Age) + β14*(Avg. Years
Regis) + ε
Taken alone the OLS model provides an adequate representation of the empirical
phenomenon, but this data is intrinsically spatial. Testing the initial data model for
spatial correlation of the residuals yields the true spatial nature of the data. An initial
model of the data was run using a traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) with results
listed in Table 1. Moran’s I was calculated on the model residuals. Moran’s I is a global
measure of spatial dependence; valid values fall between -1 and 1 with -1 being complete
dispersion, 1 being complete clustering, and 0 being complete spatial randomness. The
value of -0.3577 was significant at the 99% interval. The model did not appropriately
deal with the spatial dependence inherent in voter turnout data.
Spatial Durbin Error Model
The analysis follows a specific-to-general approach whereby a simple linear
model, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), is specified and tested for spatial dependence; this
is considered the benchmark model useful for comparison of both model parameters and
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values of individual variables (Elhorst, 2010). Analysis with voter data is inherently
spatial in nature (Gimpel & Schuknecht 2003). Gimpel & Schuknecht (2003) used a
spatial lag model to deal with the inherent spatial dependence in the data. Following
Lacombe et al. (2012) the data will be analyzed using a Spatial Durbin Error Model
(SDEM). The SDEM adds a spatially autocorrelated error term and lagged versions of the
independent variables to the equation (Elhorst 2010). This model then factors in the direct
(β) and indirect effects (θ) of the independent variables on EV participation and deals
with global spatial dependence in the error term. Elhorst (2010) found that this model has
been used infrequently in empirical work. Lacombe, Halloway, & Shaughnessy (2014)
sought to test the model against traditional spatial regressions, including the Spatial
Durbin model, and found that, in the case of voter turnout analyses, the SDEM is
preferred, not only because the Bayesian model tests clearly point to the SDEM as the
best for their work, but for the fact that voter participation has many unknown and
unquantifiable variables that can have a direct influence on the individual voter. Using
this method also permits the direct comparison of coefficients from the OLS model and
the SDEM (Elhorst 2010). This analysis is focused on using the OLS to SDEM specificto-general approach. Equation 5.3 gives the specific equation for the Spatial Durbin Error
Model (SDEM).
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Equation 5.3. – Specific Form of the Spatial Durbin Error Model
log(EVPR) = α + β1*(Nearest EV Site Dist) + β2*(Nearest EV Site Dist Diff’08-‘12) +
β3*(SOE is REP) + β4*(SOE REP interact Dist Diff ’08-‘12) +
β5*log(%Sunday) + β6*log(%Last Day) + β7*log(%EV 2008 GE) +
β8*log(%Democrats) + β9*log(%Female) + β10*log(%Black) +
β11*log(%Educated) + β12*(Med. HH Inc) + β13*(Avg. Age) + β14*(Avg. Years
Regis) + θ1*W(Nearest EV Site Dist) + θ2*W(Nearest EV Site Dist Diff’08-‘12)
+ θ3*W(SOE is REP) + θ4*W(SOE REP interact Dist Diff ’08-‘12) +
θ5*Wlog(%Sunday) + θ6*Wlog(%Last Day) + θ7*Wlog(%EV 2008 GE) +
θ8*Wlog(%Democrats) + θ9*Wlog(%Female) + θ10*Wlog(%Black) +
θ11*Wlog(%Educated) + θ12*W(Med. HH Inc) + θ13*W(Avg. Age) +
θ14*W(Avg. Years Regis) + u; where u= λWu+ ε
Summary
The Methods chapter covers the research design. I specify the importance social
scientists must place on the spatiotemporal aspects of data analysis. The lingering effects
of spatial dependence persist in analyses that use cross-sectional data. To deal with the
lasting spatial dependence of the data when using a traditional ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression, the chapter introduces five additional spatial regression models, the
SLX, or the spatial lag X; the SLM, or spatial lag model; the SEM, or the spatial error
model; the SDM, or the spatial Durbin model; and the SDEM, or the spatial Durbin Error
model. Each model adds additional independent variables, or error terms, that are added
into the model which were derived from the spatial interaction of the variables.
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The chapter goes on to demonstrate how the other various spatial regression
models improve upon the traditional ordinary least squares model by along a battery of
model parameters. The spatial models improve the log-likelihood, Akaike information
criterion, the Schwarz criterion, and the standard error parameters. The Spatial Durbin
Error Model (SDEM) performs the best in model parameter optimization.
The chapter closes by describing the generic and specific forms of the OLS and
SDEM. Chapter 6 shows the model outputs for both the OLS and SDEM and shares
insights on how the model answers the hypothetical questions.
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CHAPTER 6
FINDINGS AND RESULTS
Testing for Impact
Slight changes in costs to participate in casting an early vote will dissuade voters
from utilizing that voting method for casting their ballot. To test the hypothesis that early
voting participation rates for electoral precincts is predicated on the costs incurred by the
voters, I test three main variables that capture the costs dynamically. Four explanatory
variables are the distance to the nearest early voting location and the change in distance
to the nearest early voting location from the 2008 General Election to the 2012 General
Election. Expanding upon the basic cost calculations, I test whether politics enters the
bureaucracy by isolating precincts where a change occurred between General Elections
and the local SOE is a Republican. Isolating in this manner allows the identification of
the impact of local discretionary decision-making on voting participation outcomes.
Equation 4.1.a gives the general equation for the ordinary least squares (OLS) model.
OLS Results
I provide the results of the OLS regression in Figure 6.1. The OLS has a high R-squared
of 0.7813, suggesting the model is very good at predicting EVPR. Ten of the fourteen
variables are significant at 99%. Of the explanatory variables – Nearest EV Site Dist.,
Distance Difference, SOE is REP, Distance changed with REP SOE – three are
significant. Consistent with prior expectations, each additional mile to the nearest EV site
lowers EVPR by almost -0.3%; and, a one-mile increase in the distance to the nearest EV
site lowers EVPR by about -4.4%. However, when the SOE is a Republican, EVPR is
8.5% higher; and when a REP SOE changed sites, the effect was not significant.

68

Figure 6.1. OLS Model Output
Model I
Linear (OLS)
Direct Effect β

Variable
Nearest EV Site Dist (1 mile)
Distance Difference (1 mile)
SOE is REP
Distance changed with REP SOE (1 mile)
Percent Sunday (ln)
Percent Last Day (ln)
Percent EV 2008 General Election (ln)
Percent Democrats (ln)
Percent Female (ln)
Percent Black (ln)
Percent Educated (ln)
Median Household Income ($10K USD)
Average Age (5 years)
Average Years Registered to Vote (5 years)

n
R-squared
Akaike Inforation Criterion (AIC)
Log likelihood

-0.2898***
[0.000]
-4.3781***
[0.000]
8.5271***
[0.008]
-0.1588
[0.000]
-0.0275***
[0.006]
-0.0458***
[0.009]
0.9444***
[0.008]
-0.0004
[0.014]
-0.4455***
[0.045]
0.0268***
[0.003]
0.3077**
[0.065]
0.1589
[0.000]
-1.4989***
[0.001]
2.2319***
[0.001]
5767
0.7813
397.3
-183.7

Significance tests *p<=0.10, **p<=0.05, ***p<=0.01
Standard errors are in brackets [].
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Figure 6.2. Variable Correlation Matrix
1

2

3

Percent EV 2008
1
General Election

1.0000

2 Percent Dems

0.2729

1.0000

3 Percent Female

0.0525

0.2415

1.0000

4 Percent Black

0.3694

0.6452

0.1444

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

-0.0966 -0.2490 -0.0688 -0.1676

6 Percent Last Day

-0.0008

0.1250 -0.0787

0.3334 -0.1232

1.0000

0.0032

0.0036 -0.0904

0.1112

0.2131

1.0000

-0.0704 -0.3908 -0.1973 -0.2422

0.3497 -0.1460

0.0875

1.0000

-0.3178 -0.2827

0.1880 -0.4898

0.1122 -0.4110

0.0388

0.0152

1.0000

-0.2410

0.1570 -0.0986

0.0700 -0.1068

0.0261

0.0986

0.2915

1.0000

0.0578 -0.0396 -0.0682

0.0005

0.1184

0.0678

1.0000

0.0467 -0.0050

0.0271

0.0236

0.0094

0.0523

0.1669 -0.0093 -0.1485 -0.0596

0.0955

0.0118

0.1572 -0.0308

8

Median Household
Income

9 Average Age
10

Average Years
Registered to Vote

11 Nearest EV Site Dist
12

Nearest EV Site Dist
Diff '08-'12

13 SOE is REP
14

SOE REP interact Dist
Diff '08-'12

0.0663

-0.3837 -0.1726 -0.0929 -0.2169
0.0935 -0.0279

0.0156 -0.0601

-0.1840 -0.3426 -0.0088 -0.1519
0.0766

0.0108

14

1.0000

5 Percent Educated

7 Percent Sunday

13

0.0086 -0.0124

1.0000

0.0119

0.0420 -0.0045
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0.0138

0.0466

0.0530 -0.0016 -0.0106

0.0172

1.0000
1.0000

0.6929 -0.1394

1.0000

Figure 6.2 shows the correlation matrix of the independent variables. There is a moderate
correlation between the percentage Democrats and the percentage black voters of the
sample precincts. Figure 6.3 shows that no individual variable has a high VIF, and the
Mean VIF is low overall at 1.61.
Figure 6.3. Test for Multicollinearity

Variable
Percent Dems
Percent Black
SOE REP interact Dist Diff '08-'12
Nearest EV Site Dist Diff '08-'12
Average Age
Median Household Income
Percent EV 2008 General Election
Percent Last Day
SOE is REP
Average Years Registered to Vote
Nearest EV Site Dist
Percent Female
Percent Educated
Percent Sunday
Mean VIF

VIF
2.47
2.42
1.99
1.99
1.86
1.51
1.50
1.44
1.33
1.23
1.22
1.21
1.21
1.16
1.61

Recall that an OLS regression that uses cross-sectional data violates the i.i.d
assumption. Though the R-squared of the initial analysis is very high, and the tests for
correlation and multicollinearity look good, cross-sectional data is susceptible to spatial
autocorrelation. Figure 6.4 shows the results of the Moran’s I test for spatial
autocorrelation of the residuals. The Moran’s I value is 0.3567, meaning the residuals are
clustered; the value is statistically significant at 99%. OLS will not work for this type of
data. The model residuals show that the spatial elements of this cross-sectional dataset
have not been dealt with.
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Figure 6.4. Moran’s I Test for Clustering of Model Residuals

Spatial Econometric Modeling
Newer spatial econometric models can account for both global and/or local
spillover effects to better control the underlying spatial structure of cross-sectional data.
Chapter 5 covers variations of spatial econometric models that researchers use to control
for the spatial nature of cross-sectional data. The best fitting model for predicting early
voting participation is the Spatial Durbin Error Model. The SDEM factors in the local
spatial spillover effects and global disturbances. Figure 6.5 shows the differences in betas
between the OLS and SDEM from R using the spdep package (Bivand & Piras, 2015).
The betas from the SDEM are directly comparable to the OLS.
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Figure 6.5. OLS and SDEM Model Comparison

Variable
Nearest EV Site Dist (1 mile)
Distance Difference (1 mile)
SOE is REP
Distance changed with REP SOE (1 mile)
Percent Sunday (ln)
Percent Last Day (ln)
Percent EV 2008 General Election (ln)
Percent Democrats (ln)
Percent Female (ln)
Percent Black (ln)
Percent Educated (ln)
Median Household Income ($10K USD)
Average Age (5 years)
Average Years Registered to Vote (5 years)
Spatial Error Term - Lambda

n
R-squared
Akaike Inforation Criterion (AIC)
Log likelihood

Model I
Linear (OLS)

Spatial Durbin Error
(SDEM)

Direct Effect β

Direct Effect β

-0.2898***
[0.000]
-4.3781***
[0.000]
8.5271***
[0.008]
-0.1588
[0.000]
-0.0275***
[0.006]
-0.0458***
[0.009]
0.9444***
[0.008]
-0.0004
[0.014]
-0.4455***
[0.045]
0.0268***
[0.003]
0.3077**
[0.065]
0.1589
[0.000]
-1.4989***
[0.001]
2.2319***
[0.001]
-

-1.0916***
[0.000]
-2.7731***
[0.000]
7.9280***
[0.026]
-0.6116
[0.000]
-0.0183***
[0.005]
-0.0279***
[0.008]
0.8401***
[0.011]
-0.0346**
[0.016]
-0.3565***
[0.043]
0.0190***
[0.003]
0.1576**
[0.065]
0.2840*
[0.000]
-2.4627***
[0.001]
1.3969*
[0.001]
0.5761***
[0.014]

5767
0.7813
397.3
-183.7

5767
0.855
-1188.4
625.2

Significance tests *p<=0.10, **p<=0.05, ***p<=0.01
Standard errors are in brackets [].
NB: For above - The Beta coefficients are cross comparable for the model types used.
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The spatial model improves upon the traditional linear regression. There is spatial
dependency in the data. Lambda, or the spatial error term, is significant at 99%. Rsquared is still very high; both the AIC and the log-likelihood have reversed signs, with
the AIC is lower and the log-likelihood much higher. The SDEM pulls some of the value
out of the betas that are associated with the spillover impact from the neighbors. Now
only nine of the fourteen variables are significant at 99%.
Of the explanatory variables – Nearest EV Site Dist., Distance Difference, SOE is
REP, Distance changed with REP SOE – three are still significant, but the values changed
dramatically. Having a Republican SOE is still positive; EVPR is 7.9% higher; and when
a REP SOE changed sites, the effect was still insignificant. Precincts that have an SOE
who is registered Republican have EVPRs that are 7.9280 points higher than those SOEs
have different party identities – significant at 99%. Precincts that have an SOE who is
registered Republican who moved an EV site have EVPRs that are 0.6116 points lower
than those whose SOEs have different party identities – insignificant. Now, each
additional mile to the nearest EV site lowers EVPR. As the distance from the precinct to
the EV site increases by one mile, the EVPR falls by 1.0916% – significant at 99%. As
the distance from the precinct to the EV site that was changed from 2008 to 2012
increases by one mile, the EVPR falls by 2.7731% – significant at 99%.
The OLS model clearly overstates the effect of the lagged dependent variable, the
2008 precinct EVPR. The spatial models dampen the effect of the 2008 precinct EVPR.
A 1% change in the EVPR from the 2008 General Election increases the 2012 EVPR by
0.8401%. The impact of the lagged dependent variable is significant at 99%. This
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indicates that voters who have had previous experience with early voting will tend to cast
an early ballot during the next election.
The following control variables show how elastic EVPR is to that variable which
is useful in understanding EVPR. A 1% increase in the percentage of Democrats
decreases the EVPR by 0.0346% – significant at 99%. A 1% change in the percentage of
Female voters that make up a precinct decreases the 2012 EVPR by 0.3565% –
significant at 99%. A 1% change in the percentage of Black voters that make up a
precinct increases its EVPR by 0.0190% – significant at 99%. A 1% change in the
percentage of Educated voters (completed an AA or higher) that make up a precinct
increases its EVPR by 0.1576% – significant at 95%. A 1% change in the percentage of
voters that cast an early vote on Sunday for a precinct decreases its EVPR by 0.0275% –
significant at 99%. A 1% change in the percentage of voters that cast an early vote on the
Last Day (Saturday) for a precinct decreases its overall EVPR by 0.0279% – significant
at 99%.
Other traditional controls like income, age, and years registered are in their level
form and can be interpreted as a semi-elasticity of the dependent variable. The most
important variable is age. When the average age increases by five (5) years, the EVPR
falls by 2.4627% – significant at 99%. Older voters may prefer voting substitutes –
absentee or traditional precinct voting – over early voting. Median household income is
important. When median household income increases by $10,000 (USD) EVPR increases
by 0.2840% – significant at 95%. Yet, the time registered seems less able to predict
EVPR. When the average years registered increases by five (5) years, the EVPR
increases by 1.3969% points – significant at 90%.
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Spatial Spillovers
The SDEM also calculates the local spillover effects and the global disturbances
inherent in the model noted in the spatial error term. Recall that regression models that
incorporate space in the model, allow for the calculation of direct effects (own effects)
and spillover effects that manifest as either indirect effects (neighbor effects) or macro
effects (global effects or disturbances). The spatial Durbin error model (SDEM) provides
an advantage over the traditional OLS and the spatial error model by allowing for the
calculation of the direct effect and the indirect effects. The indirect effect is an indicator
of how homogeneous precinct’s surroundings are. The precincts are small areas, so
spillovers are natural. For instance, yard signs in one precinct may influence the voters in
the neighboring precinct. The indirect effects capture these types of spatial interactions
between neighboring geographies.
Figure 6.6 introduces the indirect, or neighbor effects. Reviewing the indirect effects
column, six of the fourteen variables are significant at 99%. Of the explanatory variables
– Nearest EV Site Dist., Distance Difference, SOE is REP, Distance changed with REP
SOE – only two are significant. Now, each additional mile to the nearest EV site lowers
EVPR by -0.92%; and, a one-mile increase in the distance to the nearest EV site lowers
EVPR by -2.6%. Having a Republican SOE is still positive, but insignificant; when a
REP SOE changed sites, the effect was still insignificant.
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Figure 6.6. SDEM Direct and Indirect Effects
Model II
Spatial Durbin Error (SDEM)

Variable
Nearest EV Site Dist (1 mile)
Nearest EV Site Dist Diff '08-'12 (1 mile)
SOE is REP
SOE REP interact Dist Diff '08-'12 (1 mile)
Percent Sunday (ln)
Percent Last Day (ln)
Percent EV 2008 General Election (ln)
Percent Democrats (ln)
Percent Female (ln)
Percent Black (ln)
Percent Educated (ln)
Median Household Income ($10K USD)
Average Age (5 years)
Average Years Registered to Vote (5 years)

Direct Effect - Indirect Effect β
ϴ
-1.0916***
0.9203***
[0.000]
[0.000]
-2.7731***
-2.5827***
[0.000]
[0.000]
7.9280***
0.0759
[0.026]
[0.030]
-0.6116
1.1679
[0.000]
[0.000]
-0.0183***
-0.0112
[0.005]
[0.014]
-0.0279***
-0.0603***
[0.008]
[0.021]
0.8401***
0.1261***
[0.011]
[0.018]
-0.0346**
0.0218
[0.016]
[0.030]
-0.3565***
-0.0926
[0.043]
[0.093]
0.0190***
0.0202***
[0.003]
[0.007]
0.1576**
0.3569**
[0.065]
[0.147]
0.2840*
-0.4670
[0.000]
[0.000]
-2.4627***
1.9327***
[0.001]
[0.001]
1.3969*
1.6924
[0.001]
[0.003]

Significance tests *p<=0.10, **p<=0.05, ***p<=0.01
Standard errors are in brackets [].
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This section explains only the indirect, or neighborhood effect (shown in the chart
as theta). Surprisingly, a Republican SOE has no spillover impact. When an observation’s
neighboring precincts have an SOE, who is registered Republican, who moved an EV site
have EVPRs that are 1.1679 points higher than those whose SOEs have different party
identities – insignificant. When an observation’s neighboring precincts have an SOE,
who is registered Republican, have EVPRs that are 0.0759 points higher than those SOEs
have different party identities – insignificant.
As the distance from the precinct to the EV site increases by one mile for an
observation’s neighboring precincts, the EVPR increases by 0.9203% – significant at
99%. And, as the distance from the precinct to the EV site that was changed from 2008 to
2012 increases by one mile for an observation’s neighboring precincts, the EVPR falls by
2.5827% – significant at 99%. The latter is interesting in that it is like the beta value in
sign and magnitude. Precincts and their neighbors were very negatively affected by
changes in the nearest early voting site from one election to the next.
As suspected, past performance, EVPR from 2008, has a small impact. Once a
voter decides to become an early voter, neighborhood influences do not seem to have an
appreciable impact. A 1% increase in the EVPR from the 2008 General Election in an
observation’s neighboring precincts increases the 2012 EVPR by 0.1261%. The impact of
the lagged dependent variable is significant at 99%.
Interestingly, some neighborhood variables influence in unexpected ways. Age is
now positive. When the average age increases by five (5) years in an observation’s
neighboring precincts, the EVPR increases by 1.9327% – significant at 99%. Median
income is now negative, which might suggest wealthier voters might choose other voting
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methods. The median household income for precincts is insignificant to EVPR. The
analysis shows that when median household income increases by $10,000 (USD) in an
observation’s neighboring precincts EVPR decreases by 0.2840% – insignificant. The
increase in percent Black for a precinct’s neighbors depicts a more homogeneous region.
A 1% change in the percentage of Black voters in an observation’s neighboring precincts
increases its EVPR by 0.0202% – significant at 99%. For Black voters, the homogeneity
of the region seems to grow mobilization efforts around early voting, recognized in the
“Souls to the Polls” organization efforts. Concentrated precincts of educated voters
behave differently as well. A 1% change in the percentage of Educated voters (completed
an AA or higher) in an observation’s neighboring precincts increases its EVPR by
0.3569% – significant at 95%; this is twice the local effect.
Many control variables show small neighborhood spillover impacts. A 1%
increase in the percentage of Democrats in an observation’s neighboring precincts
increases the EVPR by 0.0218% – insignificant. A 1% increase in the percentage of
Female voters in an observation’s neighboring precincts decreases the 2012 EVPR by
0.0926% – significant at 99%. A 1% change in the percentage of voters that cast an early
vote on Sunday in an observation’s neighboring precincts decreases its EVPR by
0.0112% – insignificant. A 1% change in the percentage of voters that cast an early vote
on the Last Day (Saturday) in an observation’s neighboring precincts decreases its overall
EVPR by 0.0603% – significant at 99%. Familiarity with the election process, years
registered to vote, had a similarly similar impact as the local effect. When the average
years registered increases by five (5) years in an observation’s neighboring precincts the
EVPR increases by 1.6924% points – insignificant.
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Total Effect
The Total Effect statistic from the SDEM model gives the clearest picture of how
the variables affect precinct EVPR. The total effect statistics output from an SDEM
model can flip the sign or the significance of either the direct or indirect measures. The
research question seeks to uncover the effect of the discretionary action on precinct early
voting turnout. The aggregation of the total effect explains how the decisions affect the
average precinct within the state. The “total effect” in an SDEM model is calculated by
adding the beta and theta values. Figure 6.7 shows the beta, theta, and total effect
statistics for the SDEM model.
Figure 6.7. SDEM Total Effects
Direct Effect - β

Indirect Effect - ϴ

Nearest EV Site Dist (1 mile)

-1.0916***

0.9203***

Nearest EV Site Dist Diff '08-'12 (1 mile)

-2.7731***

-2.5827***

7.9280***

0.0759

Variable

SOE is REP

-0.6116

1.1679

Percent Sunday (ln)

-0.0183***

-0.0112

Percent Last Day (ln)

-0.0279***

-0.0603***

Percent EV 2008 General Election (ln)

0.8401***

0.1260***

Percent Dems (ln)

-0.0346**

0.0218

Percent Female (ln)

-0.3565***

-0.0926

0.0190***

0.0202***

0.1576**

0.3569**

0.2840*

-0.4670

-2.4627***

1.9327***

1.3969*

1.6924

SOE REP interact Dist Diff '08-'12 (1 mile)

Percent Black (ln)
Percent Educated (ln)
Median Household Income ($10K USD)
Average Age (5 years)
Average years registered to vote (5 years)

Total Effect = β + ϴ
-0.1714
-5.3558***
8.0038***
0.5562
-0.0296*
-0.0882***
0.9661***
-0.0128
-0.4491***
0.0392***
0.5144***
-0.1830
-0.5300
3.0893**

Significance tests *p<=0.10, **p<=0.05, ***p<=0.01
NB: The Beta coefficients plus the Theta coefficients create the Total Effect.

According to Figure 6.7, seven of the independent variables have a total effect
that is significant. Very surprisingly, precincts that have an SOE who is registered
Republican have EVPRs that are 8% higher than non-Republican SOEs – significant at
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99%. Republican SOEs may have better facilities, conduct more voter education, or have
better early voting facilities; more research is needed to understand this difference. More
importantly to the research question, precincts that have an SOE who is registered
Republican who moved an EV site have EVPRs that are 0.5562 points higher than nonRepublican SOEs – insignificant. Republican SOEs did not use their discretion in a way
that added undue costs to their voters. An opposite finding would have been indicative of
maladministration that was injurious to citizens.
On distance, for every additional mile the early voting location moves between
elections, precinct EVPR falls about 5.4% – significant at 99%. This is a very valuable
insight. Election administrators should be reluctant to move voting locations. The impacts
on voters are very large. Voters are most likely dissuaded from voting because they incur
“searching costs” while looking for a new location they may not be familiar with.
The variables Percent Sunday and Percent Last Day attempt to test the limitations
on available weekend days imposed by the Florida Legislature. The convenience days of
Saturday and Sunday, do not seem to be so valuable. A one percent increase in the
percentage of precinct voters who voted on Sunday shrinks precinct EVPR by 0.0296% –
insignificant. A concentration of voters who vote early on the Last Day shows more
dramatic negative impacts than Sunday. A one percent increase in the precinct voters that
vote on the last available early voting day, a Saturday, shrinks EVPR by 0.0882% –
significant at 99%. The weekend days may not be as convenient because many voters
will try to use their free-time to vote, and the facilities will not be able to meet the
additional demand. Voters may even be dissuaded to stand in line as they pass the early
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voting location, preferring to spend their day off engaging in an activity that is more
personally rewarding.
Previous early voting participation is the best indicator of future early voting
participation. The lagged dependent variable of 2008 EVPR continues to be the best
indicator for precinct 2012 EVPR. For every 1% increase in precinct EVPR for the 2008
General Election, precinct EVPR increases by 0.9661%, which is significant at 99%.
Prior early voting is nearly unit-elastic with current voting; it is almost one-to-one. This
indicates that voters who have had previous experience with early voting will tend to cast
an early ballot during the next election.
The age and tenure statistics are no longer significant. As the average age of
precinct voters increases by five years, the EVPR falls by 0.53 points. As the average
number of years registered for precinct voters increases by one year, the EVPR falls by
0.166%. Years registered is a measure of a voter’s familiarity with the voting process.
When the average years registered increases by ten (10) years, the EVPR increases by
1.67% points – insignificant. Median income is also insignificant. When the median
income of a precinct increases by ten thousand dollars ($10,000), the EVPR falls by
0.183% – insignificant.
Education is significant as is percent female, but their signs are opposite. As the
percent educated increases, precinct EVPR increases by 0.5144% – significant at 99%;
this finding is consistent with existing assumptions. A 1% change in the percentage of
Female voters that make up a precinct decreases the 2012 EVPR by 0.4491% –
significant at 99%.
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As precincts and their surrounding areas have higher percentages in Black voters,
EVPR goes up. This is significant, and particularly noteworthy given the strong
correlation between Democrats and Black voters. Surprisingly, as the percentage of
Democrats increases, EVPR falls; though this is insignificant, it is contrary to existing
assumptions. The statistics should match more closely. There is more to the patterns of
voting participation than a voters’ party identity.
Answering the Research Questions
The total effects of the SDEM answer the main research questions and
hypotheses. The question is nicely summarized in a quote from Meier & O’Toole (2006)
“Does bureau A change what it is doing at time t (t -1) after some political activity takes
place?” (Meier & O’Toole, 2006, p. 183). This study looked at a political activity, the
restriction of early voting laws, and asked whether a bureau, the Supervisor of Elections,
changed what it does. Meier and O’Toole (2006) used a lagged dependent variable to
estimate time effect. I used distance calculations from one election event to the next
where the political intervention was in the middle. I find that Republican SOEs, who
should have been influenced by a political directive, did not change their early voting
locations in a way that impacted voting outcomes, captured here as the early voting
participation rate.
1. Did the SOE comply with F.S. 101.657 and locate their early voting sites “so as to
provide all voters in the county an equal opportunity to cast a ballot” for the 2012
General Election? If voters must travel long distances, then EVPR will decrease. I
calculate the distance between the voter precinct and the nearest early voting
location for 2012 and test this independent variable.
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As the distance to the nearest EV site increases, EVPR falls slightly; the total effect is
insignificant. The hypothesis is rejected.
2. When an EV site changes from one General Election to the next (a four-year
period), does that change in location have an impact on EVPR? As distance
increases from one election to the next, EVPR will decrease. I calculate the
distance between the voter precinct and the nearest early voting location for both
2008 and 2012 and calculate the difference and test this as an independent
variable.
As the distance to the nearest EV site changes, EVPR falls by -5.4%. The indirect effects
are as high as the direct effects; the total effect is significant at 99%. The hypothesis
cannot be rejected.
3. Is there a difference in the way precincts early vote when the SOE is a Republican
versus a non-Republican? If the SOE is a Republican, then they will not promote
early voting.
When the SOE is a Republican, precinct EVPR is 8.0% higher than other partisan SOEs.
The hypothesis cannot be rejected. Furthermore, when a Republican SOE changed EV
sites between elections, the effect was insignificant.
Summary
The Findings and Results chapter provides the model returns for the OLS and
SDEM models. The chapter introduces the OLS model as the baseline for comparing the
model betas. Then the chapter moves to the SDEM. The SDEM model allows for the
interpretation of the direct and indirect effects of a control variable on the dependent
variable. The direct effects are a measure of the “own effects” of the individual precinct,
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while indirect effects represent the “spillover impacts” of the neighboring precincts.
Both models are shown to allow for comparison of their betas, but ultimately, the full
“total effect” provided by the SDEM prove most informative.
Using spatial econometric models, I find that Republican SOEs did not distribute
early voting locations in a way that negatively impacted early voting participation rates
(EVPR) for their local precincts. Furthermore, I find that, all else equal, their decisions did
not statistically impact EVPR differently than the EVPR in communities managed by
Democrats. Republican SOEs did not add new costs to voters in their communities. I
provide new evidence that demonstrates that bureaucrats can indeed limit the influence of
undue politics from their influential co-partisans to promote more democratic outcomes.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Politics and the Bureaucracy
Political control is a battlefield and political parties game election laws. Elected
politicians set the election laws, and local bureaucrats run the mechanics of voting.
Florida’s long lines in 2012 stem from sweeping changes to the early voting laws
Florida’s politicians enacted the year prior. In 2011, the Republican-led Florida
Legislature passed a bill (HB 1355) that dramatically changed the character of Florida’s
election laws for the 2012 election cycle; Republican Governor Rick Scott signed the bill
into law. HB 1355 both limited individual voter registration activities and early voting
access. Chief among the changes, and of primary interest of this dissertation, was the
reduction in the early in-person voting (EV) period from fourteen (14) days to eight (8)
days and the further temporal restriction which eliminated the last Sunday before Election
Day as a viable option for holding early voting.
Conducting an election involves a complex interplay of laws and administrative
practices, and maladministration can lead to problems ensuring truly democratic
outcomes. Florida is a state with a storied election history. Florida’s local election
bureaucrats, the Supervisor of Elections (SOE), play a pivotal role in facilitating our
democracy and the peaceful transfer of power. The General Election in 2000 was a
national wake-up call. Local SOEs became important to understand for their role in the
process.
Again in 2004, and in 2008, various local jurisdictions had trouble with
administering national elections. The General Election in 2012 was just as riddled with
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issues. Voting was particularly difficult in South Florida. Palm Beach County sent out
incorrect ballots to voters; Broward County found many uncounted voted mail ballots
after the election was closed. Miami-Dade County had the most visible and egregious
problems with long lines of voters waiting for long hours. Failed administration of
national elections at the local level eventually manifests as negative externalities outside
of those jurisdictions impeding our ability to finalize the selection of national leaders.
Casting a ballot before Election Day is a new phenomenon. Casting an early inperson vote in Florida began in 2004. At the local level, SOEs have discretionary
authority to decide the number and location of early voting sites within their community.
The main question for this project builds from this scenario. Florida’s SOEs have
discretion over two facets of early voting for their communities – number and location.
Did SOEs, who are registered Republicans, use their discretionary authority
around the number and location of early voting sites within their communities to limit
early voting in a way that actively represented the overt position of their co-partisans in
State government? I hypothesize that if a Republican moved the location of early voting
sites for 2012 in their communities from their location in the 2008 election, then those
changes will lower precinct early voting participation. This analysis shows that additional
costs borne by the voters will lead to less early voting participation. Early voting
participation is relatively elastic to the cost of voting. Demand for early voting is not unit
elastic. When voting laws change, the local SOEs (the producers) bear the cost as voters
change their method of voting.
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Theoretical Implications
The discipline of public administration stands on a tradition of separation between
elected officials who make the laws, and the public bureaucrats who implement policies
in communities. This separation assumes a necessary level of independence on the part of
the bureaucrats that, normatively, compels them to deliver services objectionably with
overarching impartiality toward political demands and a notable disassociation from
intrinsic personal interests. Yet, the divide is seemingly narrow. This dissertation
provides new empirical evidence showing the effects of partisanship decision-making
regarding election laws and administrative practices and their impact on voter
participation in elections. Specifically, the research explores the discretionary decisionmaking of the local Supervisors of Elections (SOEs) in Florida, bureaucrats who
administer the day-to-day operations of community voting access, to ascertain whether
they actively represent the political position of their co-partisans in limiting access to
early in-person voting, or if they behave in a manner that is consistent with public
administration orthodoxy.
The research follows a natural-experiment designed to explore the political
influence of state legislation. Very few studies have looked at the impact that
discretionary decisions made by the LEO have on voters. Additionally, this study uses a
real-world case that shows how public leaders can impact how citizens access and
participate in their democracy. More empirical research that utilizes spatial regression
helps the field of public administration as a discipline understand the dynamic interaction
between lawmakers and the managers who implement public policy.
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Numerous authors have explored public management and found that the
discretion public administrators have over decision-making can have significant impacts
on communities. The active representation literature has looked at how the decisionmaking can benefit the represented group; within that research, the notion of active
representation of the bureaucrat, or discretionary decision-making on behalf of a specific
group, has been held as normatively good (Hindera, 1993; Meier, 1993; Selden et al.,
1998). As Lim (2006) indicated, active representation can be abused. Election
administration is one area of public administration that we can study to find and uncover
the impact of discretionary decision-making that manifests in the form of active
representation of the bureaucracy. The effect of discretionary decision-making that is
directed to benefit one group is not ideal when the demographic characteristic being
advanced is political party identification.
Voting in free and fair elections is a hallmark of our democracy. Understanding
the profession of election administration is new and faces constant challenges. The field
of public administration can do much to influence the process by studying choices and
testing their outcomes. All levels of government are involved in the administration of a
federal election from legislation to administration. There is reason to be concerned with
the impact legislation has on voter turnout; there is also reason to be concerned with the
discretion permitted to local election administrators to implement laws. Care should be
taken at all levels of government not to institute policies or practices that promote voter
suppression.
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Policy Implications
The findings are clear. Changing early voting locations from one location to
another affects early voting participation. Local election officials should take pause when
contemplating making substantial changes from one election to another.
After the 2012 election debacle, the Florida Legislature and Governor Scott were
quick to reinstate the early voting period. Governor Scott remarked, “We need more early
voting days, which should include an option of the Sunday before Election Day. And, we
need more early voting locations.” Governor Rick Scott – January 17, 2013.
In 2013 the Florida Legislature passed a new early voting law that reinstated the
early voting period to allow for the same number of early voting days as in 2008. In this
case, adding additional Sunday voting back into the early voting period should be
considered when the election laws are reviewed during the 2013 legislative session.
Senate Bill 600 reintroduces Sunday EV prior to the election. To what level analysis like
this has impacted the discussion is unknown. There have not been any changes to the law
that defines the number and location of early voting sites for each county. This analysis
demonstrates that longer distances to early voting locations do have a negative impact on
early voting participation. Fewer sites in a county mean longer distances for certain parts
of the community. Some consideration should be spent on loosening the rules on whether
voters can cross county lines to vote early.
Florida’s election law has a “one-size-fits-all” solution to early voting. Florida
Statute only dictates that the SOE have a minimum of one early voting site in their
community; Florida Statute provides SOEs with the discretion to add additional sites
based on the practicality of their distribution within the community. SOEs are not
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required, under the law, to provide early voting sites based on a per capita minimum (for
example, there is no requirement to provide an early voting site for every additional 3,000
registered voters in a community). For instance, Florida’s most populous county, MiamiDade, is only required to have one early voting site for its over 1.3 million registered
voters; that requirement is identical for Liberty County, whose voter population is just
over 4,500 people. With no direction from the State, Florida’s Supervisors of Elections
must use their local knowledge of their community to make discretionary decisions on
the number and location of their early voting facilities. The State should explore setting
per capita requirements for the number of early voting facilities needed in each county to
ensure efficient and equitable access.
Map 7.1. Precincts Closer to Ineligible EV Site
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Additionally, per this analysis, over 680,000 voters in the state of Florida live
closer to an early voting site in another county than their home county. Map 7.1 shows a
cluster of 37 precincts from Pinellas County that are closer to early voting facilities in
either Pasco or Hillsborough County. Statewide voting registration systems allow SOEs
to access the voting information of all Florida voters. Technology that leverages the
statewide system, like electronic poll books and ballot-on-demand systems, could make it
possible for voters to early vote in any EV site across the state, irrespective of their
county of residence.
This research shows that advanced quantitative methods can be applied in a robust
way to explore election administration performance. Analysis, like the one proposed here,
can assist election administrators in preparing for voter turnout. I demonstrate how
assumptions about how state and local decisions are made affect neighborhood voting
preferences. In moving forward, more counties should be measured this way to allow for
more generalizability. More work should be done to create a richer understanding of
which administrative laws and organizational capacities truly impact the ability for our
democracy to grow and flourish. The focus should not be at the federal level, the state
level, or the county level specifically. There needs to be a comprehensive dialog, founded
on data analytics, that questions the decisions made at all levels of election governance
and, together, those decisions impact voters and the whole of the election process. It is
imperative for the US to resolve its election practices to remain the beacon for
democracy.
This analysis provides additional empirical evidence and insights toward the
discussion of the role of county governments in our federalized system. Two issues of
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Public Administration Review (1992; 2005) explored the question as to how well the
field of public administration understands the role of counties. They promoted a wide
research agenda that essentially looked to understand the state-county conflict. In that
vein, Salant (Salant in Benton, 2005) suggested that states may be losing their authority
to counties. By extension, Benton (2005) suggested that counties can act as laboratories
for democracy, and further questioned, “Can counties become pivotal forces between
citizen and state?” The analysis provided in this study shows the conflict between state
and county in Florida and shows evidence that county administrators do play a role
between state and citizen that is pivotal. Florida’s SOEs use their discretion in ways that
seemingly conflict with the state; that conflict most likely stems from the relative
closeness of local SOEs to their constituents. This analysis speaks to the overarching
county research agenda, but more work should be done along these lines to elicit more
understanding on the role of county constitutional officers and their relationship with
their counterparts at the state.
The exposition of this study suggests that two parallel and opposing perspectives
on bureaucracy persist in the academic traditions of political science and public
administration – bureaucracy vs. democracy and bureaucracy vs. politics. Upon
reflection, a simple reduction in terms might best explain the phenomenon both traditions
are genuinely looking to understand – the seemingly adversarial relationship between
democracy vs. politics. Bureaucracy is an integral actor in a representative democracy
providing a firewall against super-charged political decisions that are calculated in such a
way as to be injurious to targeted groups. Alvarez et el. (2008) debated the need for nonpartisan election officials. With the results from this analysis, the debate is far from
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resolved. This study shows how partisan bureaucrats can behave in accordance with their
professional ethics even when faced with an overt directive from their partisan superiors
while also evading any expectations of active representation on behalf of the voters who
elected them into office.
Limitations
The modeling exercise requires many assumptions that are held throughout the
analysis. First, I assume that politics motivates all actors. Next, I assume the state-level
politicians responsible for changing the early voting laws preferred lower early voting
participation irrespective of how it impacted their own party. I also assume local SOEs
are intimately familiar with the communities in which they administer elections.
The SDEM model provides clear benefits over both the OLS and the SEM
models. The model has better overall parameters with a smaller AIC and larger loglikelihood than the competing specifications. Nonetheless, a Moran’s I test for spatial
dependence in the SDEM residuals, though nearly 0 in value, is still significant at 99%.
The LM test is also significant. Therefore, the SDEM does not completely remove all
spatial effects from the modeled data. This model is either misspecified, or there are true
spatial dependencies in the underlying data. The spatial characteristics of the data are true
artifacts of the “substantive interaction between observations in space” of the
phenomenon being studied (Revelli in Bivand 2008).
Final Thoughts
This study looks to empirically test whether local bureaucrats, who should be
willing to act in-line with influential co-partisans, might still promote democratic
outcomes for their constituents with their discretionary decision-making. Florida provides

94

an empirical backdrop for testing bureaucracy’s impact on democracy with a natural
experimental scenario created with the passing of new early voting limitations in 2011.
Florida’s Republican lawmakers passed House Bill 1355 (HB 1355) that dramatically
limited the early voting days allowed for federal elections. The move was widely seen as
a political calculation aimed at stifling the participation of Democrats in the 2012 General
Election. Bureaucracy can facilitate democracy outside of politics.
Florida’s local bureaucrats, Republican SOEs, should have followed a political
motivation, but they did not. Their public service motivation, constitutional requirements,
and ethical code guide them from compromising the office and citizens’ voting rights.
Their behavior may have come from their instinctive “inner-check” that allows them to,
“[O]perate beyond the decisions and actions that can reasonably be monitored by political
overseers and may even enable bureaucrats to “respond” in an anticipatory sense to broad
public preferences without explicit intervention or signaling from politicians.” (Meier and
O’Toole, 178). Local bureaucrats have a role in protecting our democracy when it is
imperiled by politics cementing their necessary role in a representative democracy.
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